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[VOL. 16

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMIRALTY -

CHOICE OF LAW -

JONES ACT HELD APPLICABLE IN

ACTION AGAINST RESIDENT ALIEN SHIPOWNER.

Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis (U.S. 1970)
Plaintiff, a Greek seaman, brought suit under the Jones Act' against
the owner of the ship Hellenic Hero for injuries sustained while on
board the ship in the Port of New Orleans. 2 The district court, sitting
without a jury, rendered judgment for the seaman,3 and the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 4 The Supreme Court, with three

Justices dissenting, affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit, holding
that because of the defendant's residence in the United States, coupled
with his extensive business contacts with this country, the Jones Act
applied even though neither the owner nor the seaman were United
States citizens, and the ship was under the Greek flag. Hellenic Lines,

Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
The issue of exactly when section 688 of the Jones Act should be
applied has been confronted by many courts resulting in various and
sometimes contradictory applications of the Act. However, all courts
have recognized the liberal spirit of the Act, and therefore, have not
limited its application solely to American seamen injured on American

ships in American waters. For example, the Act has been held to be
applicable where American seamen have been injured on foreign ships,5
1. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 § 33, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964), provides:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right
of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying
or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to
railway employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result
of any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may
maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such

action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action

for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such
actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer
resides or in which his principal office is located.
2. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., was not the sole defendant. The other petitioner is
Universal Cargo Carriers, Inc., a Panamanian corporation which owns the ship.
The Hellenic Hero is managed by petitioner Hellenic Lines, Ltd., and flies a Greek
flag. The seaman is a Greek citizen and resident, and his contract of employment

provides for the application of Greek law and a Greek collective bargaining agree-

ment. Ninety-five percent of the stock in both of the corporations is owned by

Pericles Callimanopoulos, a Greek citizen who has resided in this country since 1945,

and achieved permanent resident status in 1953. All of the voyages of the ship were
in the transportation of cargo either to or from the United States.
3. 273 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Ala. 1967).
4. 412 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1969).
5. See, e.g., Uravic v. Jakarta Co., 282 U.S. 234 (1930), where an American
stevedore was permitted recovery under the Jones Act from a foreign owner, when
the injury he sustained occurred on a German ship in the Port of New York.

(148)
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and when a resident alien was injured on a foreign vessel in American
waters. 6 The courts also have applied the Act to allow recovery by both
American and alien seamen when the injury occurred on board a ship
which, although flying a foreign flag, was actually beneficially owned
7
and controlled by Americans.
Despite these numerous interpretations of the Act, it was not until
1953 that the Supreme Court in Lauritzen v. Larsen8 began to formulate
a set of guidelines for the application of the Jones Act. In Lauritzen,
the Court held that the Act would not be applied in a situation where
both the seaman and the shipowner were aliens, and the sole contact
with the United States was the fortuitious occurrence of an accident
in American waters.9 In considering the application of the Act, the
Court enumerated seven factors which it considered to be significant. 10
They include: (1) the place of the wrongful act;" (2) the law of the
flag;12 (3)

the allegiance or domicile of the plaintiff seaman;13 (4) the

allegiance of the defendant shipowner;14
tract;15

(6)

(5)

the place of the con-

the relative inaccessibility of a foreign forum;16 and (7)

the law of the forum.' 7 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the
law of the flag was the most determinative factor, in spite of the increasing occurrence of the use of flags of convenience.' 8
6. See, e.g., Gambera v. Bergoty, 132 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1942).
7. See Gerradin v. United Fruit Co., 60 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1932) ; Bobolakis v.

Compania Panamena Maritima, 168 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ; Bartholomew v.
Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000
(1959) ; Voyiatzis v. National Shipping & Trading Corp., 199 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
8. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
9. This doctrine appears to be quite settled, and was also followed in Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), where the plaintiff,
defendant, ship, corporation and contract were all Spanish, and the voyage was to
begin and end in Spain, and the main contact with the United States was that the
accident occurred in American waters.
10. 345 U.S. at 583-90. See generally Note, Admiralty And The Choice Of Law:
Lauritzen v. Larsen Applied, 47 VA. L. REV. 1400 (1961).
11. This factor was given little weight, due to the widespread travels of ships,
which makes the location of the accident purely fortuitous. 345 U.S. at 583.
12. This factor was hailed by Mr. Justice Jackson as that "most venerable and
universal rule." The state where the ship is registered is to have paramount authority
over it, so that the ship can have uniformity of law in its travels. This factor is not
to be disregarded unless there is some prevailing "counterweight," thus being the
most important of the criteria. 345 U.S. at 584.
13. This factor was cited as one of the more important factors in the test. 345
U.S. at 586.
14. This factor has relatively the same weight as that of the allegiance of the
seaman. 345 U.S. at 587.
15. This factor is not too important, since the place of signing may be, and often
is determined wholly by chance. 345 U.S. at 588.
16. This factor was given little weight. 345 U.S. at 590.
17. This factor is not of great significance, serving the purpose of pointing out
that the mere fact that the defendant has contacts sufficient for in personam jurisdiction does not mean that substantive laws apply to him for his extra-territorial torts.
345 U.S. at 590.
18. 345 U.S. at 587. It is not an uncommon practice for American shipowners
to sail under the flag of a country whose shipping laws and registry requirements are
not as stringent as those of the United States. The most frequently used flags of
convenience are those of Liberia and Honduras. In cases of convenient registry, there
is little doubt that the courts will assert their authority. See Bobolakis v. Compania
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The thrust of the application of the Jones Act after Lauritzen is
concerned with expanding and modifying the seven criteria to broaden
the scope of recovery provided for protected seamen in the face of
financial and legal legerdemain on the part of American shippers. In
1958, for example, the District Court for the Southern District of New
9
York, in Bobolakis v. Compania Panamena Maritima,1
found majority
ownership by American citizens of a foreign corporation which owned
a Panamanian ship to be a controlling factor in applying the Act. The
Second Circuit, in Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 20 formulated what might be called the "substantial contacts" doctrine to meet
the problem of convenient registry. This doctrine weighs all of the
factors constituting "contacts" between the vessel in question and the
United States, whether or not they are included in the criteria enumerated in Lauritzen. In Pavlou v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp.,21 the
District Court for the Southern District of New York in holding that
if a corporation appears to be a de facto American one, its incorporation in a foreign country will not allow it to escape liability, considered
the factor of business contacts to be determinative in allowing recovery.
Although most of the previous cases have served to extend the
application of the Jones Act and to liberalize its interpretation, it must
be noted that in all of these cases recovery was either by American
citizen or domiciliary seaman or against American citizen shipowners.
Panamena Maritima, 168 F. Supp. 236, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where the court held that:
[There is] . . . grave doubt that it can any longer be seriously contended that
the courts will not take jurisdiction of a Jones Act case where the plaintiff is an
alien and this country's sole significant contact with the case is American ownership of the vessel itself.
See also Southern Cross S.S. Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651, 653 (4th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961), where the court held that "[i]f the law of the flag is to

control, the flag must not be one of convenience merely, but bona fide."
19. 168 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
20. 263 F.2d at 441 (2d Cir. 1959). The test involves:
• . . [T]he ascertainment of the facts or groups of facts which constitute contacts
between the transaction involved in the case and the United States, and then
deciding whether or not they are substantial. . . . Moreover, each factor, or
contact, or group of facts must be tested in the light of the underlying objective,
which is to effectuate the liberal purposes of the Jones Act.
According to this outlook, the contacts between the transaction and the United States
would be weighted according to their relative factual importance, which may or may
not be in the same hierarchy as that proposed by Justice Jackson in Lauritzen.
21. 211 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The Pavlou court stated:
When a mode and manner of doing business which have all the attributes of a
domestic business operation, the business or corporation may become subject to
the laws of this country, even though the more formal manifestations of the
arrangement appear to be foreign.
Id. at 324. In Pavlou, recovery was allowed where the plaintiff was a Greek citizen
and resident and forty-eight and one-half per cent of the corporation which owned
the ship was owned by American citizens, although the company was totally operated
and controlled from New York. Similarly, in an earlier case, Southern Cross S.S. Co.
v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1960), recovery was allowed by a Greek seaman
where only twenty per cent of the corporation was owned by Americans, the remainder
by Greek citizens, with joint control of the operation being in New York. In both
of these cases, the most important factors were the degree of American control and
the fact that the situs of control was this country.
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It was not until Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp.,22 that any
court confronted the question of whether section 688 of the Jones Act
applied to a foreign seaman involved in an accident in an American port
on a ship owned by a foreign corporation with the principal shareholder
being a permanent alien domiciliary of the United States. Furthermore,
the ship was flying a foreign flag and its operations were controlled
from the United States. The Second Circuit's response to this question
was that the Act did not apply. However, on substantially the same
facts as those presented in Tsakonites, the Fifth Circuit in the instant
23
case took the opposite view, holding that the Jones Act was applicable.
On appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in an effort to reconcile the opposing decisions.
Speaking for the majority in Hellenic Lines, Mr. Justice Douglas
admitted that the majority of the criteria set forth in Lauritzen were not
favorable to the plantiff24 -

the ship's flag was Greek; the employment

contract was under the laws of Greece; the injured seaman was Greek;
and there was a foreign forum available.2 5 However, the Court noted
that the Lauritzen test was not meant to be either exhaustive or mechanically applied, 26 and intimated that the reason that the Tsakonites
court reached its decision was because of a mechanical application of
these criteria.
To support their eschewal of a mechanical application of the
Lauritzen test, the Hellenic court cited Lauritzen itself and other cases
which have held that in some cases one factor alone may be sufficient to
invoke the application of the Jones Act.2 7 The Court, citing Pavlou and
Bartholomew as precedent, also noted that other factors in addition to
those cited in Lauritren have been held to be controlling.28 Reasoning
22. 368 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1007 (1967).

23. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1969). Both the
Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in the instant case rely heavily on the
reasoning of the dissent in Tsakonites to reach the present holding.
24. See notes 11-17 supra and accompanying text.
25. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308 (1970).
26. Id.
27. Id. 345 U.S. at 586. The "one factor alone" to which Justice Jackson alluded
in Lauritzen was, of course, the law of the flag.
28. Most of these "other factors" deal with the use of convenient flags, and the
evolution of the business contacts doctrine. See, e.g., Gerradin v. United Fruit Co.,
60 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1932), where the court allowed recovery by an American seaman
against American owners, although the flag of the ship was Honduran; Bobolakis v.
Compania Panamena Maritima, 168 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where an alien
plaintiff was permitted recovery where a Panamanian registered ship was owned in
the majority and operated by citizens of New York; Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959), which
formulated the substantial contacts test in awarding damages to an alien seaman
against American citizens who owned a ship flying a Liberian flag; Southern Cross
S.S. Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961),
where recovery was allowed an alien seaman against a corporation owned only twenty
per cent by Americans, although all of the control of the corporation was in America;
Voyiatzis v. National Shipping & Trading Corp., 199 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
where once again, American citizen ownership was the critical factor; and Pavlou v.
Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), where forty-eight
and one-half per cent control of the corporation was the deciding factor.
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from these prior decisions, and seemingly expanding the substantial
contacts test, the Hellenic Court established what might be termed an
actual operational contacts test. The Court stated that:
If the liberal purposes of the Jones Act are to be effectuated,
the facade of the operation must be considered as minor, compared
with the real nature of the operation and a cold objective look at
the actual operational contacts
that this ship and this owner have
29
with the United States.
Having extended30 the precedent of previous cases to arrive at this
test, the Court then relied on the "you must pay for what you get"
rationale of the dissent in Tsakonites to include the defendant in that
class of employers to whom the Act applies.8 ' The majority in Hellenic
reasoned that the broad constitutional protections afforded resident aliens
are benefits that are not to be accepted without concomitant responsibilities.3 2 Thus, they concluded that if the defendant is afforded the
protections of the Constitution while reneging on the duties imposed
by the law, he would have an unfair advantage over American ship33

owners.

In reaching their decision. the Court suggested3 4 that the instant
holding is an abandonment of the mechanical application of the Lauritzen criteria in favor of an approach which recognizes the national interest to be served and the true liberal spirit of the Act. It is true that
any presentation of nearly exhaustive and fairly definite criteria might
create its own limitations. By falling into a mechanical application of
the Lauritzen criteria, courts run the risk of becoming more concerned
with form rather than with substance, thus frustrating any attempts to
liberally construe the statute. With a mechanical approach, the Lauritzen
criteria are susceptible to being fulfilled by formalities rather than facts.
The instant decision, however, would look to actual operational contacts to determine whether in fact a corporation with foreign manifesta29. 398 U.S. at 310.

30. The broadening of the doctrine exists from the fact that Pavlou and Bartho-

lomew used the substantial and business contacts tests to find beneficial American
ownership, i.e., there had to be a person behind the operation who was an actual
American citizen and the Hellenic majority looked to the economic ties of the cor-

porate entity to see if it is or is not a de facto American corporation, regardless of

the citizenship of the corporation's owners.
31. Id. at 256.
32. Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 368 F.2d 426, 430 (2d Cir. 1967)
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1007 (1967). That aliens are accorded
the same rights as citizens under the Constitution is substantiated by Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945), a deportation case in which the alien's right to the
protection of the Bill of Rights, especially the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments
was upheld. See also Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953). Basically, the only
major advantages which a citizen has over a resident alien are the rights to vote
and to run for office.

33. 398 U.S. at 310. See also Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 368
F.2d at 430 (dissenting opinion).
34. 398 U.S. at 310. See generally 48

TEXAs

L. REv. 480 (1969).
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tions is a de facto American one.3 5 Thus, the Hellenic court adhered
to the concept that economic ties determine the maritime allegiance of
a shipowner.36
While the majority would appear to be correct in rejecting the
mechanical application of certain enumerated criteria, their new operational contacts test suffers from several difficulties, as pointed out by
the dissent. While the majority decision in Hellenic centers on determining the liability of the employer, the dissent approaches the problem
from the standpoint of the protection of the seaman. Mr. justice Harlan
in his dissenting opinion presents three major objections to the majority
decision: (1) the majority is misconstruing the purpose of the Act;
(2) the principles of comity and international law suggest that American interference in such an area is unwise; and (3) practical considerations make such a stand either unfeasible or illogical.
While the purpose of the Jones Act is unclear due to the universality of its wording and the fact that there is no comprehensive legislative
history reflecting a clear congressional intent,3 7 it would appear that the
dissent is correct in concluding that the basis for the bill's enactment
was not to fix liability of employers, but to protect the crews of ships. 38
Therefore, in determining whether to apply the Jones Act, the courts
should look first to the crewman.3 9 If the crewman is a member of
that class for whom section 688 of the Jones Act was constructed, then
the court is justified in applying the actual operational contact test to
35. See note 21 supra. See also 44 TUL. L. REv. 347 (1970), where the author
reaches the same conclusion on this point in his analysis of the case in the lower court.
36. See 38 FORDHAm L. REV. 105, 108 (1970).
37. The wording of the Act is that "any seaman . . . may maintain an action,"
and yet it is clear that Congress neither intended, nor had the power to confer the
right on all seamen. 345 U.S. at 577.
Section 688 of the Jones Act was an amendment of the Seamen's Welfare Act
of 1915 (LaFollette Act) § 20, ch. 153, 38 Stat. 1164, 1185; 46 U.S.C. § 688. The Act
in its entirety is concerned with the establishment of the Merchant Marine and with
regulating United States shipping and shipping corporations. The section here dealt
with is included under miscellaneous provisions. Ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007. It
confers on seamen the right, not granted at common law, to maintain an action
against his employer for injuries arising from the actions or negligence of the master,
officers or crew of the ship. 48 TEXAS L. REV. 480 (1969). The suit is brought in
personam against the owner, rather than in rem against the ship. Lauritzen v. Larsen,
345 U.S. 571, 574 (1953).
38. See Gambera v. Bergoty, 132 F.2d 414, 416 (2d Cir. 1942), where Judge
Learned Hand said:
The Jones Act was the culmination of a series of efforts, largely those of the
Seamen's Union, to secure more adequate relief for American seamen injured in
their employment. It is extremely unlikely that Congress should have meant to
exclude aliens who, in every sense that mattered, were members of that class
merely because they had not been naturalized (emphasis added).
See also O'Neill v. Cunard White Star, 160 F.2d 446, 448 (2d Cir. 1947), where the
court noted that it was:
True, the Act should be liberally construed, intended as it was for the protection of a class which until relatively recent times were subject to great abuses
(emphasis added).
39. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in the instant case said:
The only justification that I can see for extending extra-territorially, a
remedial type provision like § 688 is that the injured seaman is an individual
whose well-being is a concern of this country.
389 U.S. at 313 (dissenting opinion).
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include the shipowner as an employer within the scope of the Act. 40 In
the instant case, the majority's approach is reversed, in that it uses the
operational contacts test to apply the act to the shipowner while disregarding the fact that the crewman is not within the scope of protection afforded by the Act. The single fact that defendant-shipowner had
extensive business contacts with the United States is not, by itself, a
sufficient ground for invoking the Act, since the Act was meant for the
protection of seamen in whom America has a legitimate interest either
through the citizenship or domicile of the seamen or indirectly through
citizenship of the shipowner. 41 The plaintiff in the instant case does not
fall into this class of seamen. In addition, he was sailing on a ship of
his own sovereign, and had chosen his own law to govern disputes and
42
provide a remedy.
The second objection of the dissent - that principles of comity
would seem to dictate that Greek law and a Greek forum should take
precedence - seems well taken under the instant facts. The doctrine of
allowing a ship to follow and be controlled by the law of the flag under
which it flies is based on the legal fiction that the ship is an extension
of the sovereign whose ensign it flies, 43 and serves the practical purpose
44
of allowing a ship to follow one law.

The nation whose ensign a ship flies does have a legitimate interest in
the activities of that ship, particularly with respect to the revenue it provides. In this sense, ships are minor extensions of their sovereigns. Therefore, while there is a sound basis for disregarding the law of the flag when
40. Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in the instant case put it most
concisely when he stated:
Lauritzen in enumerating these factors ("contacts") as independent considerations, was attempting to focus analysis on those factors that are the necessary
ingredients for a statutory cause of action; first, as a matter of statutory construction, is plaintiff within that class of seamen that Congress intended to
cover by the statute; and, second, is there a sufficient nexus between the defendant
and this country so as to justify the assertion of legislative jurisdiction? . . . In
this regard the situs of the accident or the vessel's contacts with this country by
virtue of its beneficial ownership or the frequency of calls at our ports simply
serve as an adequate nexus between this country and defendant to assert jurisdiction in a case where congressional policy is otherwise furthered. But no
matter how qualitatively substantial or numerous these kinds of "contacts" may
be, they have no bearing in themselves on whether Jones Act recovery is
appropriate in a given instance. For transactions occurring aboard foreign flag
vessels that question should be answered by reference to the plaintiff's relationship to this country.
398 U.S. at 315 (dissentinig opinion).
41. See note 21 supra. Note that in both Pavlou and Southern Cross, great
weight was put on the fact that a substantial amount of ownership, and virtually all
control, was in the hands of American citizens.
42. The court said in the instant case: ". . . it seems to be conceded that
respondent could obtain relief through Greek courts, if he desired." 398 U.S. at 308.
In Tsakonites, plaintiff, after being denied recovery under the Jones Act, did subsequently recover under Greek Law. Brief for the Royal Greek Government as Amicus
Curiae, Exhibit A at 11, Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
43. See U.S. v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155 (1933).
44. 345 U.S. at 585. In Lauritzen, the need for uniformity and order in a ship's
on-board transactions was of great importance in making the law of the flag foremost of the seven criteria.
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the flag is the result of a convenient registry, 45 principles of "comity,
reciprocity, and long-range interests ' 46 of other nations dictate that this
"most venerable rule" not be overthrown with impunity.4 7
Moreover, it

has been held that American law should not supercede the law of the
flag without some clear expression to the contrary from Congress. 8
In many cases where American law has been applied to another
sovereign's vessel, it was done where the activities or transactions in
dispute affected the United States, and not merely the internal community of the ship.

49

It may be that in the instant case, the transaction does indeed have
an effect on the United States. The seaman could conceivably be injured
seriously enough to become a permanent ward of the state, in which
case, those American interests which will incur the cost of caring for
him would provide a legitimate basis for this country taking interest
in the seaman. For this reason, it might be better to give greater weight
to the Lauritzen criterion of the law of the place where the tort occurred.50 This factor has been accorded little importance by the courts
45. See note 7 supra.
46. 345 U.S. at 582.
47. It was probably this caveat in Lauritzen which prompted the court to deny
recovery in Tsakonites. In that case, the majority held that, although the corporation
had extensive business contacts with the United States, the fact that the flag, ship,
owner, articles and crew were all Greek tends to negate the supposition that the flag
was one of convenience. Although Greece had no business contacts with the Hellenic
Spirit, crews were picked up and discharged there. All of the contracts of the crew
were Greek. There was no reason to suppose that the crew knew anything of American law, or that they would have chosen American law rather than Greek had they
known. Control of the operation was in the hands of a Greek citizen, regardless of
where he resided. Therefore, the court reasoned, the dictates of international law
and comity required that Greek law, and not American, take precedence. 368 F.2d at
429. Even if, as respondent asserted in his brief in Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis.
at 39. the seaman was illiterate, and signed the articles because his employer assured
him that it was "alright" [sicl, it still seems that a Greek citizen (even a literate
one) would be more apt to choose his own law, rather than that of a foreign country,
unless, of course, he could profit economically by choosing another country.
48. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 133 (1923) (dissenting opinion),
where prohibition laws were enforced on foreign ships in American ports because
Congress expressly provided for such application.
49. See Wildenhus' Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887), where the court held that the port
authorities should not interfere with the operations of the vessel unless the on-board
transaction disturbs the peace or dignity of the country or the tranquility of the port.
120 U.S. at 12. In that case a Belgian sailor killed another crewman on a Belvian
ship while in an American port, and criminal sanctions were imposed. See also U.S.
v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933), where it was held that for criminal offenses, the
jurisdiction of the vessel must yield to the jurisdiction of the port, unless that port
fails to assert or otherwise waives authority.
50. See Bobolakis v. Compania Panamena Maritima, 168 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) ; Voyiatzis v. National Shipping & Trading Corp., 199 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y.
1961): Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959). cert.
denied. 359 U.S. 1000 (1959) ; and Southern Cross S.S. Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651
(4th Cir. 1960). cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961). All claim that the place of the
accident is of significance.
The Lauritcen court did not attribute much significance to this factor. It
stated that:
[Tihe test of location of the wrongful act or omission, however sufficient for
torts ashore, is of limited application to shipboard torts, because of the varieties
of legal authority over waters she may navigate. . . . [T]he territorial standard
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for the reason stated in Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co., 51 that:
Although the place of injury has often been deemed determinative of the choice of law in Municipal conflict of laws, such a rule
does not fit the accommodations that become relevant in fair and
prudent regard for the interests of foreign nations in the regulation of their own ships and their own nationals . . .
It seems, however, that such a rationale is not for the protection
of the seaman per se, but rather for the vindication of American interests involved in caring for him.5 2 Such purposes are clearly not
within the scope of the Jones Act. 53 Furthermore, simple compensation
for medical expenses could be adequately provided for by the remedy
of maintenance and cure, which provides for all medical payments and
wages to the end of the voyage, not including damages for pain and
suffering.
Even assuming that the situs where the tort occurs is a valid
factor, 54 the majority's decision to disregard the law of the flag in favor
of American law still seems unwarranted. 55 First, as pointed out in
Tsakonites, there is no reason to assume that, on a Greek ship with a
Greek master, crew and owner, and where Greek law was stipulated as
controlling, there was any intent on behalf of any of the parties that any
law except Greek should be controlling. 6 Secondly, the Hellenic Hero,
registered under the Greek flag is not a ship flying a flag of convenience - one whose owners are not citizens of the country whose flag
the ship flies. 57 The convenient flag is flown to cut expenses and sidestep "troublesome" shipping regulations. 58 Greece does not provide the
benefits commonly sought by convenient registration, since there is not
the laxity of shipping laws that exist, for example, in Liberia or Honduras. 59 Convenient registry, then, implies a sham or "cover-up" by
which the owner registers his ship in a country other than his own.
Certainly a shipowner flying the flag of his own country, even if that
country is one which is generally sought for convenient registry, cannot
be presumed to be constructing a facade. In this case, the defendant's
is so unfitted to an enterprise conducted under many territorial rules and under
none that it usually is modified by the more constant law of the flag.
345 U.S. at 583-84.
51. 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1959). For additional support of this contention, see 47
VA. L. REV. 1400 (1961); Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the
Romero Case, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 67 (1959).
52. Currie, supra note 51, at 67 et seq.
53. Id.
54. Note, however, that this factor played no part in the majority decision in
the instant case.
55. See 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 110 (1970).
56. See note 47 supra.
57. 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 108 (1970). See Petition for Rehearing, Hellenic
Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970). The contention that a Greek owned
ship, sailing under the Greek flag, with a Greek crew is a sham is somewhat anomalous.
58. See note 18 supra.
59. See 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 108 (1970).
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residence in this country was calculated to better control his extensive business contacts with the United States. However, to call the
Greek flag one of convenience in this case must require a determination that the defendant's Greek citizenship was one of convenience
and that his residence in the United States makes him a de facto
American, and the Greek flag a sham.
Moreover, in order to give the Jones Act a construction which will
harmonize legitimate interests of other nations with international law, 60
the Court should have adhered to the long-standing rule that American
law should be imposed in conflict with the law of other nations only if
no other construction remains. 6' Since, in the instant case, the seaman
62
had an adequate remedy without the application of the Jones Act,
it is submitted that the Court made an unwarranted departure from
this rule.
Finally, there are practical obstacles to the application of the Act in
this case. As the dissent points out, the argument used by the majority that a competitive advantage in favor of resident aliens would result if
the Act is not applied - is invalid in this situation. Assuming, arguendo,
that the Greek registry of the Hellenic Hero was a convenient one
designed to give the defendant a competitive advantage over American
shipowners, the Jones Act still should not be applied. First, as correctly
stated by the dissent, "The underlying concern of the legislation . . .
is the adjustment of the risk of loss between individuals and not the
regulation of commerce or competition."Is
Furthermore, other pragmatic considerations favor the application
of Greek law by a Greek court. Greece has an interest in the ship
through the law of the flag; it is not only her right, but her duty to
administer that law.6 4 Additionally, an award granted by an American
jury to a Greek citizen might be disproportionate to the award given
him in his own country, especially compensation for pain and suffering. 5
60. See Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d at 440; Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383 (1959).
61. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963) ; The Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. 118 (1804).
62. See note 42 supra.
63. 398 U.S. at 317; see also note 38 supra.
64. See Currie, supra note 51, at 67.
65. The buying power of one American dollar in Greece in 1969 was 114% of
that same buying power in America. It could possibly be that an award to a foreign
seaman might be even more disparate. First, increased buying power inflates the
American award. If the "going rate," relatively speaking, for the same injury in the
seaman's home country is smaller than in America, the award is further inflated.
Finally, the statistical comparison of the buying power of the United States dollar
in Greece is based on computations of American families with the United Nations in
Greece. This could increase the discrepancy if there is an individual difference in
consumer attitudes, i.e., if Americans tend to have more expensive consumer preferences for the same goods than do Greeks. Also, the buying power figure must be
put in the perspective of the tendency for people to spend more when they find that
their money buys more. In other words, American families, finding that their money
would buy more, might quite possibly raise their own standard of living, so that,
while it cost them less to live in Greece for a year than it would in America, they
were living "better." Statistical Abstract of the United States at 831 (1969).
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The difference in the standards of living between America and Greece
(or, for that matter, between America and most other countries) could
enable the seaman to profit from his injury, rather than merely being
restored.6
Thus, while the liability imposed by the Jones Act on a shipowner
may be relatively insignificant with respect to the size of his total operations, because of the different relative financial positions it is not inconceivable that a foreign seaman, who would otherwise be content
with the remedy provided by his own country, will now seek restitution
in a United States court whenever possible. Nor does prohibiting Jones
Act recovery under these facts mean that an American shipowner can
escape liability by hiring an all-foreign crew, since the actual operational contacts doctrine enunciated in the instant case would preclude
this when there is true American ownership.
It is suggested that the majority, while accomplishing much in the
way of avoiding a mechanical application of the Lauritzen criteria, is
still somewhat preoccupied with the more procedural aspects of the application of the Jones Act. Although the actual operational contacts test is
an excellent means of finding the defendant shipowner to be an employer
within the scope and meaning of the Act, a decision attempting to effectuate
the liberal spirit of the Act should be grounded on the finding that the
seaman is in that class of persons for whom the Act provides protection.
W. H. Flamm, Jr.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

LOCAL REAPPORTIONMENT "'ONE
MAN, ONE VOTE" HELD APPLICABLE TO SPECIAL-FUNCTION UNITS
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

Hadley v. Junior College District (U.S. 1970)
Appellants are residents and taxpayers of the Kansas City School
District, one of eight separate school districts which have combined to
form the Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City. A Missouri statute' provides that local school districts may consolidate to form
66. See Currie, supra note 51, at 68.

1. Mo. REV. STAT. § 178.800 (1965). The statute provides for the organization
of a junior college district. A petition is presented to the state board of education
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a junior college district and elect a board of six trustees to conduct its
affairs. The statute also provides an apportionment scheme by which
each separate local school district is allocated a number of trustees to
sit on the junior college board 2 in accordance with the percentage of
the total enumeration3 - the population between the ages of six and
twenty - that reside in each school district.- The Kansas City School
District, which contains sixty percent of the total enumeration for the
entire junior college district, is represented by only three trustees or
the equivalent of fifty percent of the total enumeration.

Appellants brought suit in the Circuit Court of Jackson County,
claiming that their right to vote for the trustees was being unconstitutionally diluted in violation of the equal protection clause of the four-

teenth amendment. 4 The circuit court dismissed appellants' petition for5
declaratory relief. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed,
finding that the principle of "one man, one vote" did not apply because
the board of trustees was not a unit of local government having general
governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the body.6

The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and reversed,
holding, that when a state or local government decides to select officials
by popular election to perform governmental functions, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment demands that each quali-

fied voter be given an equal opportunity to participate in the election;
and when

members of an elected

body

are chosen

from separate

districts, each district must be established on a basis which will insure,
as far as possible, that equal numbers of voters will vote for a proportionately equal number of officials. Hadley v. Junior College District,
397 U.S. 50 (1970).
requesting that a junior college district be organized. The state board determines
whether the area proposed to be included in the district meets the standards established under the law and then the state board orders an election to vote on the
proposal and the trustees. In order for the proposal to organize the junior college
district to carry, it must receive a majority of the total number of votes cast. If the
proposal does carry, the state board orders the organization of the district and
tabulates the votes to determine which of the candidates have been elected to the
position of trustee.
2. Mo. REV. STAT. § 178.820 (1965). See discussion pp -.- -infra.
3. Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.011 (1965).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privilege of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
5. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 432 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. 1968).
6. The Supreme Court of Missouri stated:
We hold that the defendant district is essentially an administrative body created
by the legislature for the sole and special purpose of conducting a 2-year college institution, and that it is not a "unit of local government having general
governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the body."
Id. at 334. The court found that because the trustees did not have general powers they
were not bound by the precedent of Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).

See also note 14, infra.
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In the 1962 landmark decision of Baker v. Carr, 7 the Supreme Court,
overruling strong precedent," held that the question of legislative district apportionment was not a mere political question and that a voter's
challenge of an apportionment statute presented a justiciable issue.
Although the Court did not establish any standard by which the lower
courts could determine what form of relief was proper, Baker did make
it clear that the federal courts had the power to determine whether
an apportionment statute was constitutionally valid. Subsequently, in
Reynolds v. Sims9 and companion cases,' 0 the Court declared that a qualified voter has a constitutional right to vote in elections for state legislators without having his vote wrongfully diluted or debased." The
7. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Qualified Tennessee voters brought a civil action alleg-

ing denial of equal protection due to a debasement of their vote because of unequal
apportionment. The appellants alleged that because of the growth and re-distribution
of population since the last apportionment, their vote was not equal to that of voters
in other areas. The relief sought was a declaration that the apportionment act was
unconstitutional, and an injunction restraining its use in future elections. The Supreme
Court held:
(a) that the court possesses jurisdiction of the subject matter; (b) that a
justiciable cause of action is stated upon which appellants would be entitled to
appropriate relief; and (c) . . . that the appellants have standing to challenge
the Tennessee apportionment statute.
Id. at 197-98. See generally, A Symposium on Baker v. Carr, 72 YALE L.J. 7 (1962);
Comment, Baker v. Carr and Legislative Apportionment: A Problem of Standing,
72 YALE L.J. 968 (1962) ; 30 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1962); 41 TEXAS L. REV.

132 (1962).
8. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), where Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that: "[c]ourts ought not enter into this political thicket." Id. at 556.
His premise was that courts should not be entangled by granting illusory relief for
a hypothetical claim which rests on an abstract assumption. This view stood as the
guiding rule for sixteen years until it was overturned in Baker. See also Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962). See generally Note,
Constitutional Right To Congressional Districts of Equal Population, 56 YALE L.J.
127 (1946) ; 35 CALIF. L. REV. 296 (1947).

9. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The Court declared that the "one man, one vote"
principle applied to apportionment of state legislatures. The Court found that:
"... as a basic constitutional standard, The Equal Protection Clause requires that
the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a
population basis." Id. at 568. The Court expressly ruled out historical, geographical
and economic considerations, and other group interests as permissible factors in justifying deviation from a strict population standard. To this end Reynolds put the state
legislatures on notice that a strict population standard was to be employed with only
minor deviations for legitimate state objectives. See generally King, The Reynold's
Standard and Local Reapportionment, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 120 (1965) ; 43 TEXAS
L. REV. 236 (1964) ; 17 VAND. L. REV. 1519 (1965).

10. Five companion cases were decided the same day: Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) ; Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) ;
Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) ; Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v.
Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964). See
generally Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote - One
Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Carroll, The Legislative Apportionment
Cases, 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 (1964) ; Caruso, The Lucas Case and the Reapportionment of State Legislatures, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 433 (1965); Cassin, Reapportionment: The Problem That Will Not Go Away, 3 HouSTON L. REv. 310 (1966)
29 ALBANY L. REV. 133 (1965) ; 33 U. CIN. L. REV. 483 (1964).

11. The Court in reference to what minor justifications might be valid stated that:
A State may legitimately desire to maintain the integrity of various political
subdivisions, insofar as possible, and provide for compact districts of contiguous
territory in designing a legislative apportionment scheme. Valid consideration may
underlie such aims. Indiscriminate districting without any regard for political
subdivisions or natural or historical boundary lines, may be little more than open
invitation to partisan gerrymandering. .

.

. Whatever

the means of accom-
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"one man, one vote" principle was later extended, in both state'2 and
federal cases,' 3 to the local levels of government. In Avery v. Midland
County,' 4 the Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause applied to those local governmental units which exercise general governmental powers over the entire geographic area which they control.' 5
Having found that the fourteenth amendment applied to the exercise
plishment, the overriding objective must be substantial equality in population

among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal
in weight to that of any other citizen in the state.
377 U.S. at 578-79. See Irwin, Representation and Election: The Reapportionment
Cases in Retrospect, 67 MicH. L. REV. 729 (1969) ; Jewell, Minority Representation:
A Political and Judicial Question, 53 KENTUCKY L.J. 267 (1965) ; McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REV. 223 (1968).
In Kirkpatrick v. Priesler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), the Court rejected the
argument made that integrity of county lines and the maintenance of political subdivisions was a valid deviation for population variances between districts. See 19
DEPAUL L. REV. 152 (1969); 15 VILL. L. REV. 223 (1969). See generally Dixon,
Reapportionment Perspective: What is Fair Representaln?, 51 A.B.A.J. 319 (1965).
12. See, e.g., Miller v. Board of Supervisors, 63 Cal. 2d 343, 405 P.2d 857, 46
Cal. Rptr. 617 (1965) (board of supervisors); Moyer v. Campbell, 260 Iowa 1346,
152 N.W.2d 617 (1967) (county board of education); Montgomery County Council
v. Garrot, 243 Md. 634, 222 A.2d 164 (1966)
(county council); Armentrout v.
Schooler, 409 S.W.2d 138 (M"o. 1966) (city council), noted in 35 U.M.K.C. 313
(1967) ; Mauk v. Hoffman, 87 N.J. Super. 276, 209 A.2d 150 (1965) (county board
of supervisors) ; Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d 778, 262 N.Y.S.2d
444 (1965) (city council), noted in 17 SYRACUSE L. REV. 557 (1965) ; Barley v. Jones,
81 S.D. 617, 139 N.W.2d 385 (1966) (county commissioners), noted in 11 S.D.L.
REV. 386 (1966) ; Newbold v. Oscar, 425 Pa. 478, 230 A.2d 54 (1967)
(city council).
13. See, e.g., Montana v. Lee, 384 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1967) (city council);
Hyden v. Baker, 286 F. Supp. 475 (M.D. Tenn. 1968) (quarterly courts); Keil v.
Schorr, 282 F. Suop. '08 (D. Del. 1968) (county commissioners) (by implication);
Robertson v. Gallion, 282 F. Supp. 157 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (board of revenue) (dicta)
Hilton v. Threet, 280 F. Supp. 831 (M.D. Tenn. 1968) (quarterly courts) ; Kapral v.
epson, 271 F. Supp. 74 (D. Conn. 1967) (city council) ; Dyer v. Rich, 259 F. Supp.
41 (N.D. Miss. 1966) (county board of supervisors) ; Martinolich v. Dean, 256 F.
Supp. 612 (S.D. Miss. 1966) (county board of supervisors) ; Ellis v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 234 F. Supp. 945 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd & remanded, 352 F.2d 123 (4th
Cir. 1965) (city council), noted in 34 U. Ciu. L. REV. 397 (1965).
14. 390 U.S. 474 (1968). In Avery, appellants, residents and voters of Midland
County, Texas, filed suit alleging malapportionment of the four electoral districts
from which members of the County Commissioners Court were elected, which resulted
in a denial of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. The four commissioners were chosen in such a way that the urban area containing ninety-five percent
of the total population could elect only one of the four commissioners (a fifth commissioner, a county judge, was elected at large). The Commissioners Court performed various legislative, executive and judicial functions such as letting contracts,
appointing minor administrative officials, setting tax rates, issuing bonds, adopting the
county budget, establishing and maintaining a county jail, administering the county
welfare system, performing duties connected with elections, building and running
hospitals, airports, and libraries, fixing school district boundaries, establishing a housing authority, and determining election districts. Mr. Justice White writing for the
majority, reasoned: "[I]nstitutions of local government have always been a major
aspect of our system, and their responsible and responsive operation is today of increasing importance to the quality of life for more and more of our citizens." Id. at
481. On this basis the Court held that equal protection requires equality in voting
on the local level. See generally, Symposium One Man-One Vote and Local
Government, 36 GRo. WASH. L. REV. 689 (1968) ; Sentell, Avery v. Midland County:
Reapportionment and Local Government Revisited, 3 GA. L. REV. 110 (1968); 82
HARv. L. REv. 118 (1968); 52 MARQ. L. REV. 319 (1968); 20 MERCER L. REV. 454
(1969) ; 47 N.C.L. REV. 413 (1969); 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 78 (1968); 21 VAND. L.
REV.

1104 (1968).
15. 390 U.S. at 484-85.
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of state powers either directly or through subordinate agencies,", the
Avery Court determined that the election of local officials, as with state
officials, must be from equally populated districts. The principles of
17
Reynolds and Avery have been applied, with limited success, by state
8
and federal courts,' to special-purpose units such as school boards.
However, the specific issue of equal apportionment as applied to specialpurpose units had not been presented to the Supreme Court prior to the
instant case.
In Hadley, the Court initially considered what type of governmental
unit requires the application of the "one man, one vote" principle. Reaffirming the rationale of Avery that a local unit is merely an arm of
the state,' 9 the Court concluded that an elected special-purpose unit ex16. Id. at 479-80. The subdivisions of the state must comply with the fourteenth
amendment. A city, town or county cannot deny equal protection of the laws to
the citizenry. See, e.g., See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) ; Thompson v. Louisville,
362 U.S. 199 (1960) ; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958) ; Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1 (1949).
17. Meyer v. Campbell, 260 Iowa 1346, 152 N.W.2d 617 (1967). The court, relying
on Reynolds, applied the "one man, one vote" principle to a county board of education stating:
Since our own legislature chose to make members of the board elective rather
than appointive, it intended that these members represent the people and not
the geographical land areas. Each vote similarly situated is entitled to equal
representation.
Id. at 1351, 152 N.W.2d at 621. The court reasoned that because the county board
was selected by popular vote they were direct representatives of the people and the
state and federal constitutions require their election on an equal basis. Contra,
Thompson v. Board of Dir. of Turlock Irrigation Dist., 247 Cal. App. 2d 587, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 689 (1967). In Thompson, the court stated that the basis for determining
whether the "one man, one vote" principle applies to a governmental unit depends on
its purpose, the number and nature of its functions, and the manner in which they
are exercised. Therefore, the court held that an irrigation district did not have to
meet the "one man, vote vote" principle because it did not exercise general governmental powers.
18. Strickland v. Burns, 256 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1966). The court, faced
with the issue of whether a school commission composed of eleven members, each
elected from unequal districts, violated the fourteenth amendment, declared the system
unconstitutional stating:
We hold, therefore, that the discrimination existing is invidious. Since we
can find no basis for applying the "one man, one vote" rule to the congeries of
power possessed by the Legislature itself and at the same time deny its application to a subordinate body simply because it possesses a fractional part of the
powers . . . we must also hold that the apportionment provisions of the Act . . .
are void as violative of . . . the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 827. See 20 VAND. L. REV. 649 (1967). See also Pitts v. Kunsman, 251 F.
Supp. 962 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (dicta) ; Delozier v. Tyrone Area School Bd., 247 F.
Supp. 30 (W.D. Pa. 1965) ; contra, Detroit Edison Co. v. East China Township
School Dist., 247 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Mich. 1966) aff'd on other grounds, 378 F.2d
225 (6th Cir. 1967) ; Johnson v. Genesse County, 232 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
19. 397 U.S. at 53. The Avery Court had stated that political subdivisions of the
state must comply with the fourteenth amendment. The Court reasoned that ". . . the
actions of local government are the actions of the State." 390 U.S. at 480. On this
basis the local unit could no more deprive a person of equal protection of the laws
than the state. The fourteenth amendment applies to every creature of the state
to which the state government has delegated powers. The local special-function units
are merely instrumentalities of the state which indirectly implement state policies. It
follows that the local units should be governed by the same principles of equality in
voting as the state legislature or multi-function units. See also Martin, Local Reapportionment, 47 J. URB3AN L. 345 (1969), wherein the author states:
Since state legislative cases have been concerned with protecting the right to
vote, it was logical that the pattern of representation on Midland County's govern-
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ercising governmental powers that generally affect the area which it
controls is subject to the "one man, one vote" principle. 20 Although
the trustees in the instant case did not possess as broad a range of powers
as the County Commissioners Court in Avery, the trustees did exercise
governmental powers. 2x To this end, the Court reasoned that although
the trustees' authority is limited solely to the area of education, it is
nonetheless a unit of vital importance to the state because it substantially
affects the lives and welfare of the citizenry. 22 The thrust of the majority's argument on this point is that a special-purpose unit of government with a single governmental function which generally affects the
entire area over which it has control is substantially similar in kind, for
apportionment purposes, to multi-function local units and to state legislatures. Therefore, the elections of all governmental units should comply
with the standards of Reynolds, i.e., the equal protection clause requires
uniform treatment of all persons standing in the same relation to the
goverment. 23 To reach this determination the Court had to partially
abandon the standard established in Avery that before the "one man,
one vote" principle could be applied, the governmental unit must be found
to exercise "general governmental powers. ' 24 Although the Court in
the instant case uses the term "important governmental function", 25 it
seems that in light of its conclusion that all elections are important, 26
ing body should be declared unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection of
the laws, for it would be both inconsistent and unreasonable to use one application
of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state and another for its subdivisions.
Id. at 350. See also cases cited in note 18 supra.
20. 397 U.S. at 53.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 54. See also Hinton v. Threet, 280 F. Supp. 831, 839 (M.D. Tenn.
1968) ("Local government is the government closest to the people.") ; Jewell, Local
Systems of Representation: Political Consequences and Judicial Choice, 36 GEO.
WASH. L. Rzv. 790 (1968) ; Note, Reapportionment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1226, 1274-75
(1966).
23. The Reynolds Court stated:
And the concept of equal representation has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the
government action questioned or challenged. With respect to the allocation of
les'islative representation, all voters, as citizens of a State, stand in the same
relation regardless of where they live.
377 U.S. at 565. With the Court's decision in the instant case to disregard the nature
of the unit, the rationale of the Reynolds Court applies directly, although in Reynolds
the Court was considering apportionment for state legislatures. See generally Irwin,
supra note 11.
24. 390 U.S. at 485. The Avery Court limited its holding to "units of local
government having general governmental powers over the entire geographic area
served by the body." However, the trustees' power in the instant case is limited solely
to the area of education. Their powers consist of levying and collecting taxes, issuing
bonds, hiring and firing teachers, making contracts, collecting fees, supervising and
disciplining students, passing on petitions to annex school districts, and acquiring
property by condemnation. In comparison to the Commissioners Court, the trustees'
powers were small. See note 14 supra. However, the important factor that distinguished the case from Avery is the fact that the powers, instead of being general,
were limited to one special function. Therefore, the Court is now willing to disregard
the degree of power the unit possesses and focus on the selection of trustees by
popular vote.
25. 397 U.S. at 54.
26. Id. at 55.
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once it is established that an elected official exercises governmental
powers that are general enough to affect his electorate, the Court will
require the election to comply with the "one man, one vote" rule.
In concluding that the thrust of all previous cases in the voting
area is the proposition that once the goverment makes the decision that
an official is to be elected by popular vote, there is no valid constitutional
justification for allowing a person's vote to be diluted or debased in any
manner, 27 the Court rejected the suggestion that equal apportionment
should be restricted to only "important" elections. 28 What might be a
vitally important election to one voter could be of no consequence to
another. Hence, it would be impossible for a state to set a valid standard for determining what is an important election, that would be consistent with each voter's point of view. Furthermore, it is important to
note that special-purpose units are of vital importance to the effective
operation of state goverment.29 These units are more numerous, spend
more money and have a more direct effect on the citizenry than any
other governmental unit. Thus, any attempt to classify governmental
units or officials on the basis of importance would be futile.
The Court dispelled any doubt that the nature ° of a public office
or the purpose of an election 3' could be a valid consideration. Rejecting a proposed standard based upon a distinction between an election
conducted for a legislative as opposed to an administrative position, the
Court reasoned that governmental functions cannot be so easily classified. It pointed out that malapportionment impairs a voter's right to
27. Id. at 54.

28. Id. at 55.

29. See McKay, Reapportionment and Local Government, 36 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 713 (1968). The author points out that school districts are important governmental units. He states that:
More dollars of state and local money go for this purpose than any other,

and nearly all these expenditures are initially agreed to and supervised on a
day-to-day basis by individual school districts. The power to levy taxes . . .
plus the authority to fix school district lines and to determine educational policy
adds up to the exercise of important governmental power, whether or not called
by the name legislative.
Id. at 730-31. Furthermore, it should be noted that special function units are created
to meet basic needs which other units cannot adequately fulfill. Due to the very
nature of the unit and the need for its creation, it must be termed important.
30. 397 U.S. at 55-56. The Court rejected the proposed standard that a distinction should be made on the basis of whether the election is for a legislative or
administrative position, finding that governmental functions cannot easily be classified.
It should be noted that the argument that administrative bodies should not be held
to the "one man, one vote" principle is inconsistent with Grey v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368 (1963), where the Supreme Court invalidated an election system as applied to
administrative officials.
31. 397 U.S. at 55-56. One author expressed the view that:
All the arguments there advanced [Reynolds] -

that "the fundamental prin-

ciple of representative government in this country is one of equal representation
for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status or
place of residence within a State" - would sound suddenly hollow if we should
now be told that there are representative governments and representative governments ....
Once it is agreed that a particular local body performs governmental
functions, it must surely follow that the command of the equal protection clause
is applicable.
McKay, supra note 29, at 728.
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participate equally in an election regardless of whether he is voting for
a state legislator or a member of the local school board. The element
of equality must be examined from the point of view of the voter and
not upon considerations of the capacity of the elected official or the
function of the unit. 2 The harm suffered by the voter when his vote
is diluted or debased is equally as great regardless of the purpose of
the election. 8
Based upon this analysis of the "one man, one vote" principle, the
majority turned to a discussion of the Missouri statute in question. The
statute 4 provided that if no one or more of the school districts had
thirty-three and one third percent or more of the total enumeration 5
of the entire junior college district, all six trustees were to be elected
at large. If, however, one or more of the districts had between thirtythree and one third percent and fifty percent of the total enumeration,
each such district was to elect two trustees and the remainder were
to be elected at large from the other districts. Furthermore, if one district had between fifty percent and sixty-six and two thirds percent it
was to elect three trustees and if one district had over sixty-six and
two thirds percent it was to elect four trustees. Hence, the statutory
scheme allocates increasing numbers of trustees to larger districts on a
basis which is roughly proportionate to the total enumeration. To this
extent the statutory scheme reflected a degree of equality in voting. Although this was not an intentional scheme to dilute or debase voting
power, the Court declared it unconstitutional because it effectuated systematic discrimination against voters in the more populous districts.
However, this result seems inevitable whenever a district's percentage of
the total enumeration falls between one of the percentage ranges, thus
causing that district to receive the number of trustees corresponding to
the lowest point in that range. 6
In the instant case, the voters in the district containing sixty percent
of the total enumeration received three trustees, or the equivalent of
fifty percent of the total enumeration. This malapportionment diluted
the vote to the extent of ten percent, which, according to the Court did
32. 397 U.S. at 55. Any attempt at defining whether an election should comply
with the "one man, one vote" standard on the basis of the function of the unit would
be contrary to the principles of election and representation. Thus, once the decision
is made that there is to be an election, it must provide for equality under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See generally McKay, supra note 29,
at 735.
33. The Court stated:
It should be remembered that in cases like this one we are asked by voters to
insure that they are given equal treatment, and from their perspective the harm
from unequal treatment is the same in any election, regardless of the officials
selected.
397 U.S. at 55.
34. Mo. REV. STAT. § 178.820 (1965).
35. Mo. REv. STAT. § 167.011 (1965). Total enumeration is defined as all persons
between the ages of six and twenty, residing within a district.
36, 397 U.S. at 56-57.
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not meet the constitutional mandate that each person's vote must count
equally with another's "as far as practicable. '37 It seems that this type
of apportionment scheme will always fail, because whenever there exists
a percentage range, within which a fixed number of representatives are
to be elected, there will always be a dilution of voting power of those
residing in the more populous districts. For example, in the instant
case, if the school district's percentage falls within a certain percentage
range, i.e., between thirty-three and one third and fifty percent of the
total enumeration, the number of trustees allocated to a district would
be measured by the bottom of the range, or thirty-three and one third
percent, with the district receiving two trustees. If two districts fall
within the range, one having thirty-four percent of the total enumeration
and the other having forty-five percent of the total enumeration, each
would elect two trustees, even though the latter has a much greater
population. It is obvious that the allocation of trustees by the bottom
of the range greatly dilutes the voting strength of the larger districts.
If a government unit attempts to remedy the inequality by allocating
the trustees by the top of the range, i.e., all districts that fall within the
thirty-three and one third and fifty percent range are to receive three
trustees, the voting power of the more populous districts will still be
diluted. This results because the district with thirty-four percent of the
total enumeration will elect the same number of trustees as the more
populous district with forty-five percent of the total enumeration. This
type of apportionment scheme is incompatable with the equal protection
clause because the discrimination is inherent. 38
Furthermore, the alternative of tightening the percentage range, i.e.,
from a range of thirty-three and one third to fifty percent to a range
of thirty-three and one third to forty percent or below, in an attempt
to provide for equality "as far as practicable", is an unworkable solution. If this alternative is employed the number of members of the
government unit would have to be enlarged to the point where efficient
government could not be achieved. Thus, it would seem that the safest
route which a government unit could take when establishing an apportionment scheme, is to avoid a percentage range scheme.
37. The Court stated:

Thus while voters in large school districts may frequently have less effective
voting power than residents of small districts, they can never have more. Such
built-in discrimination against voters in large districts cannot be sustained as
sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate that each person's vote count
as much as another's, as far as practicable.
Id. at 57.
38. The Court did not make it clear whether a system of this nature would be
constitutional if the state had made a good faith effort to reach equality and the
resulting deviations were minor. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969),
where the Supreme Court stated that the "state must justify each variance, no
matter how small." For a discussion of how the element of good faith
the "as
far as practicable" standard, see 15 VILL. L. REV. 223, 227-29 (1969). Itaffects
submitted,
however, that a system with built-in discrimination, as the system in the isinstant
case,
would never be considered a "good faith effort."
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After its analysis of the Missouri statute, the Court considered the
degree of mathematical exactitude required for the apportionment of
special-purpose units. 39 In Wesberry v. Sanders4 ° and Reynolds4 1 the
Court had stated that although complete mathematical exactitude was
not required the district must be apportioned in a manner which will
insure equality "as far as practicable". 42 In the instant case, Mr. justice
Black implied that the Court would be willing to apply a less stringent
standard of exactitude to special-purpose units because of the complications of apportioning a small number of trustees among an equally
small number of districts. 43 However, since the Court was not required
to confront the issue as a matter of law, no concrete guidelines were
established for lower courts to follow4 4 thus, leaving the question of
what degree of exactitude will be required on the level of special-purpose
units unanswered. In light of the Court's determination that every election is important and its emphasis on equal voting power from the
voters perspective, it is difficult to justify the application of a less
stringent standard to special-purpose units. If the Court is requiring
the "one man, one vote" principle to be applied to special-purpose units
it seems inconsistent not to require the same degree of mathematical
exactitude demanded for multi-purpose units since voting power wi.l
still be diluted. Moreover, if the local governments are aware that they
do not have to meet the same requirements for mathematical exactitude
as the higher levels of state and local government, they might not make
a good faith effort to reach equality "as far as practicable". In light of
the general intent of the Court to insure equality on all levels of govern39. 397 U.S. at 58.
40. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). The Court stated that: "[T]he command of Art. I, § 2,
that Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the several States' means that as
nearly as practicable one man's vote in congressional elections is to be worth as much
as anothers." Id. at 7-8. See Weiss, An Analysis of Wesberry v. Sanders, 38 S.
CALIF. L. REV. 67 (1965) ; Note, Wesberry v. Sanders: Deep In The Thicket, 32 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 1076 (1964); 44 B.U.L. REV. 401 (1964); 77 HARV. L. REV. 131
(1963); 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 136 (1964). See generally Banzhaff, One Mant,
Votes: Mathematical Analysis of Voting Power and Effective Representation, 36
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 808 (1968); McKay, The Federal Analogy and State Apportionment Standards, 38 NOTRE

DAME

LAW. 487 (1963).

41. 377 U.S. at 568 (1963).
42. The Court has, however, required a high degree of equality. See, e.g., Wells
v. Rockfeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969) ; Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969)
Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967) ; Duddleston v. Grills, 385 U.S. 455 (1967)
Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967). Normally the state has been held to a high
degree of exactitude because of its inability to justify deviations. See generally Note,
supra note 22, at 1250-54.
43. 397 U.S. at 58.
44. Mr. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, stated:
The failure to provide guidelines for determining when the Court's "general
rule" is to be applied is exacerbated when the Court implies that the stringent
standard of "mathmatical exactitude" which are controlling in apportionment of
federal congressional districts need not be applied to smaller specialized districts
such as the junior college district in this case.
Id. at 70-71 (dissenting opinion). The Chief Justice reasoned that until the court
establishes guidelines for the interim judges to follow, their decision will have to rest
on mere speculation. Hence, the Supreme Court will have to make the final decisions
on a case by case basis until the Court established a meaningful set of guidelines.
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ment, it seems necessary to apply the same standard to the apportionment scheme for special-purpose units to insure equality "as far as
practicable".
In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan reasserted his arguments presented in Reynolds 45 and Avery, 46 and protested the majority's
45. Id. at 59. In Reynolds, Mr. Justice Harlan argued that the majority's decision
was not within the constitutional role of the Court. Asserting that it was beyond the
province of the Court to make a decision in the area of state electoral apportionment,
he stated:
Finally, these decisions give support to a current mistaken view of the Constitution and the constitutional function of this court. This view, in a nutshell, is
that every major social ill in this country can find its cure in some constitutional
"principle," and that this Court should "take the lead" in promoting reform when
other branches of government fail to act. The Constitution is not a panacea for
every blot upon the public welfare, nor should this Court, ordained as a judicial
body, be thought of as a general haven for reform movements. The Constitution
is an instrument of government, fundamental to which is the premise that in a
diffusion of governmental authority lies the greatest promise that this nation will
realize liberty for all its citizens. This Court, limited in function in accordance
with this premise, does not serve its high purpose when it exceeds its authority,
even to satisfy justified impatience with the slow workings of the political process.
For when, in the name of constitutional interpretation, the Court adds something
to the Constitution that was deliberately excluded from it, the Court in reality
substitutes its view of what should be so for the amendment process.
377 U.S. at 624-25.
Mr. Justice Harlan also expressed the view that the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment was never intended to inhibit the states in choosing
any democratic method it pleased for apportionment of its legislatures. Id. at 593-615.
See generally Dixon, Local Representation: Constitutional Mandates and Apportionment Opinions, 36 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 693, 705 (1965) ; Note, The Equal Population
Standard: A New Concept of Equal Protection in State Apportion Cases, 33 U. CIN.

L.

REV.

483, 490 (1964).

46. 397 U.S. at 59-60. In Avery, Mr. Justice Harlan protested to the Court
requiring the multi-function units of local government to comply with the "one man,
one vote" principle. The foundation of this dissent rested on the proposition that
there is no "practical necessity" to apply this standard on the local level. The argument
had been made that the federal judiciary had properly entered the field of state legislative reapportionment, since the state legislatures had failed to take affirmative steps
to correct the inherent inequality within its own structure, and those who were treated
unequally had no avenue of recourse except to the courts. Mr. Justice Harlan rejected
this justification in Avery, since those who were treated unequally on the local level
had a higher state governmental unit from which they could seek redress. He stated:
No claim is made in this case that avenues of political redress are not open
to correct any malapportionment in elective local governmental units, and it is
difficult to envisage how such a situation could arise. Local governments are
creatures of the States, and they may be reformed either by the state legislatures,
which are now required to be apportioned according to Reynolds, or by amendment of state constitutions.
390 U.S. at 489. See generally Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties and other forms of Municipal Government, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 21, 23 n.9 (1965).
In Avery, Mr. Justice Harlan also expressed the view that the "one man, one
vote" principle was inappropriate for the local unit of government because it would
"straitjacket" the local units so that they could not properly undertake their functions. He stated:
.. . [T]he greater and more varied range of functions performed by local
governmental units implies that flexibility in the form of their structure is even
more important than at the state level, and that by depriving local governments
of this needed adaptability the Court's holding may indeed defeat the very goals
of Reynolds.
390 U.S. at 490-91. See generally Martin, Local Reapportionment, 47 J. URBAN L.
345, 352 (1969).
The latter view, however, is inconsistent with Reynolds, if carried to its
logical end. If the local units were allowed to experiment with new systems and were
not checked when the systems infringed on the rights of the electorate, the phrase
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extension of the "one man, one vote" principle to special-purpose units.
His initial contention is that because of the nature of the unit in question,
i.e., single-function, the Court should not impose a uniform elective structure on the local units. 47 He reasoned that because a single-function local
unit is specialized, there must be flexibility so that its operation can be
coordinated to specific local needs. He argued that if unit officials must
be elected in accordance with the "one man, one vote" standard, the
4
unit would be inhibited from adequate consideration of local variances.
Thus, he takes the position that the need for flexibility is a justification
for refraining from applying the standards of Reynolds and Avery to
the single-function unit.
Mr. Justice Harlan also notes that the statute is new and that it
was instituted in an attempt to further a valid state objective. 49 He states
that the scheme was not instituted to wilfully deprive anyone of voting
equality, but was the best method of balancing the practical problems
involved in the creation of a new educational system through populationbased representation."0 Furthermore, he argues that the scheme is ap"... uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to government action
questioned or challenged" would be hollow. Flexibility and experimentation can only
be carried to a certain point, i.e., when the votes of the electorate are not given equal
treatment, and when the apportionment scheme does not provide for equal treatment
it must be declared unconstitutional. Flexibility and experimentation are at the heart
of our national system of government, but they must be implemented within the framework of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
47. 397 U.S. at 60--63 (dissenting opinion).
48. It is highly questionable whether the local units, as they are presently formulated, could be responsive to the needs of the people. It has been noted that malapportionment on the local level is more severe than it was on the state level, and the
governmental stagnation is more rank than it ever was on the state level. See McKay,
supra note 29, at 733. Thus, these units are not controlled by the majority and are
not in a position to take into consideration the demands of the people. Quite simply,
these units are not representative of the people. See Grant & McArthur, "One Man One Vote" and County Government: Rural, Urban and Metropolitan Implications,
36 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 760, 763 (1968). If the units were willing to undertake internal reform, there quite possibly might not be a need for the courts to enter the
"political thicket"; but the past actions of the units make it clear that internal reform
is not an adequate answer. If there is to be a reform on the local level, the stimulus
will have to come, as it has by the holding in the instant case, from the judiciary.
It is possible that a reasonable alternative to Mr. Justice Harlan's demand
for flexibility lies within the Court's demand for reapportionment. It has been suggested that reapportionment on the local level will create wide possibilities for reform,
which could be designed to foster community growth that would be representative
of the needs of the citizenry. See McKay, supra note 29, at 734, citing COMMITTEE
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING LOCAL GOVERNMENT 15 (1966). If reapportionment plans are properly implemented it could very well strengthen the local
unit, rather than weaken or "straitjacket" it, as has been suggested. See Grant &
McArthur, supra at 768. But see Hagensick, "One Man - One Vote" and County
Government, 36 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 778 (1968).
It is suggested that the demand of the Hadley court to reapportion on the
local level might have a beneficial effect on the local governments and thereby, indirectly benefit the people. With reapportionment, new groups will come into power,
whose needs have been consistently overlooked because they were not properly represented. As a result, local units may be forced to change their priorities to more
accurately reflect the needs of an expanded electorate.
49. 397 U.S. at 63-65.

50. Id. at 64. Mr. Justice Harlan points out that prior to the statute individual
school districts had the authority to establish their own junior college, but the districts
could not consolidate. The statute was enacted in response to the need for adequate

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss1/8

22

Editors: Recent Developments

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 16

portioned "as far as practicable" because the further elimination of the
disparity in voting power would place an undue burden on the state. 51
His conclusion, therefore, is that the "one man, one vote" principle with
its high degree of mathematical exactitude is satisfied by the system in
the instant case 52 since the most important consideration should be the
state's desire to provide for education. Although Mr. Justice Harlan
is willing to accept a limited debasement of an individual's vote, if it is
an incidental result of a properly motivated plan which is instituted to
fulfill a valid objective, 5 3 his analysis does not consider the fact that the
Court has consistently held that population and not the validity of government motivation is the controlling factor in apportionment schemes.
Furthermore, although the plan did not intentionally discriminate, its
effect was to treat voters unequally.
Mr. Justice Harlan also asserts that the parties entered into the districting plan voluntarily, as distinguished from Reynolds where he thinks
the Court relied heavily on the fact that a county unit was merely an
involuntary political unit of the state created by statute.5 4 Therefore, he
feels the plan in the instant case should be validated because of its voluntary nature. 55 This point seems open to question, however, since there
is an element of coercion in the plan. The voters of the local school districts had two alternatives: (1) enter the plan and have their votes
diluted, or (2) stay out of the plan and refrain from taking advantage
of the educational opportunities. Reality dictates that the districts had
no viable alternative but to enter the plan and have their votes diluted
education facilities. See Three Rivers Junior College Dist. v. Stratler, 421 S.W.2d
235, 237 (Mo. 1967). Since the statute was enacted, the number of junior colleges
has increased by five with an increase in total enrollment of 25,000.
51. Id. at 68-69. See Note, supra note 22, at 1269-83.
52. Id. at 70. See generally Weinstein, supra note 46, at 32.
53. At this juncture, Mr. Justice Harlan's position can clearly be distinguished
from the position taken by the majority. Mr. Justice Harlan is considering the
motivation for establishing the system in its present form. Mr. Justice Black, however, speaking for the majority, never actually reached this consideration. Once the
majority determines that a system is in operation which does not treat all voters
equally, the system is declared violative of the fourteenth amendment. This is
especially true when the system under consideration has built-in discrimination.
Although the government unit normally has the opportunity to justify the deviation,
the justification does not go to the motivation behind the plan. It seems that if the
majority were to take Mr. Justice Harlan's position they would be retreating from
the standards established in Reynolds and Avery. It would be totally inconsistent
with past holdings to consider the motivation behind the plan when faced with
malapportionment on the local level, since the factor of motivation was never considered when dealing with higher levels of government. Furthermore, the majority's
primary concern has always been the right to vote and to be represented equally.
Since Reynolds, the Court has consistently expressed the view that governments must
be representative of the people and that the vehicle to accomplish this goal is equal
voting power. If the people are not truly represented through the use of their vote, an
apportionment scheme must fail, notwithstanding its motivation, because it is not
fulfilling its purpose - to facilitate giving the citizenry an equal voice in government.
54. 397 U.S. at 65.
55. Id. Mr. Justice Harlan drew an anology between the establishing of the
junior college district and the creation of the federal government on the grounds
that each plan was established through voluntary compromise. He thinks that the
element of voluntariness distinguishes the instant case from Reynolds, and that the
majority, therefore, is not required to apply the holding of that case to the instant facts.
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unless they were able to independently establish their own junior college.
Even conceding the point that the districts entered the plan voluntarily, the apportionment scheme by which the trustees were delegated
to the individual districts was pre-established by statute, thereby precluding any compromise concerning the apportionment of representation.
Cognizant of the fact that special-purpose units require flexibility,
the majority discussed alternatives in which a state might insure legitimate political goals without being faced with the problem of reapportionment. Citing Dusch v. Davis,56 the Court said that a governmental
unit could establish a system in which each official is elected at large,
but then required to reside in separate districts of unequal size. The
majority reasoned that since the candidates are elected at large as opposed to being elected by district, each elector's vote will weigh substantially the same as that of any other elector. This rationale, however,
assumes that the official residing in a particular district must rely on
the population of the entire voting area for votes and, therefore, will
serve the entire voting area equally. Aside from this consideration, a
plan of this nature does not contain the invidious discrimination found
in the apportionment scheme in the instant case and, therefore, avoids
that constitutional challenge.
The Court did recognize that in certain cases a local unit might
limit the right to vote to a particular group of people. In Kramer v.
Union Free School District5 7 it recognized that a statute might be tailored
56. 387 U.S. 112 (1967). The Court was faced with the issue of whether an
apportionment scheme for the election of a city council of eleven members was constitutionally valid because of a residence requirement. Four councilmen were elected
by all of the voters and could reside anywhere in the area. The remaining seven
were elected by all of the voters of the entire area, but one was required to reside
in each of the seven districts. Each of the seven districts was of unequal size, ranging
from 300 to 38,000 voters. The court of appeals, 361 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1966),
declared the residence requirement violative of the "one man, one vote" principle. The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals holding that the plan was valid because
each of the voters in the city could vote for all the councilmen, and thus all voters
were protected under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See
Comment, Constitutional Law - Reapportionment - Effect of One Man, One Vote
Principle on Local Governments - Below the State Legislative Level, 19 S.C.L. REV.
839 (1967); 81 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1967). See generally Jewell, Local Systems of
Representation: Political Consequences and Judicial Choice, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
790 (1968).
57. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). The Supreme Court considered whether state laws
restricting the eligibility to vote satisfied the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. The issue in Kramer was whether a state could limit the right to vote in
cerain school district elections to owners or lessees of taxable property and to parents
who had children attending the school. The state attempted to justify the restriction
on the ground that it defined a group that was "primarily interested" in school affairs.
The Court held that the voting qualifications denied equal protection to those excluded
because the restriction imposed did not have the degree of precision necessary to meet
the strict standards of review to meet the requirements of the equal protection clause.
See 33 ALBANY L. REV. 183 (1968); 83 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1969); 23 Sw. L.J.
964 (1969) ; 47 TEXAS L. REV. 134 (1968).
See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). The issue in this
case was whether the state could restrict the right to vote to those who owned taxable
property when voting on revenue bonds for public utilities. The state attempted to
justify the restriction on, the ground that only property owners had a "specific property interest" because the utilities directly affected property values and the "security"
of the taxpayers' investment. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the restric-
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in a manner that excluded a given group if such a restriction was necessary to articulate a compelling state interest and those excluded f'or
the electoral process are substantially less interested and affected by the
unit than those the statute includes. 58 It seems, however, that the election of any unit having the power to tax, spend money, or affect the
lives and property of the citizenry will necessitate that all voters have
an equal voice in the electoral process. 59
tions were not precise enough to meet the requisite standard of review required by
the equal protection clause. See 83 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1969) ; 30 LA. L. REv. 377
(1969); 67 MIcH. L. REV. 1260 (1969).
See also Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970), where the issue was
whether the federal constitution permits a state to restrict the right to vote in
elections to approve the issue of general obligation bonds to only real property taxpayers. The bonds were issued to finance various municipal improvements, i.e., city
sewer systems, parks and playgrounds, police and public safety buildings, and libraries.
Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority, declared the exclusion of otherwise
qualified voters, who did not pay property tax, a violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Relying on Kramer and Cipriano he stated:
The differences between the interests of property owners and the interests of
nonproperty owners are not sufficiently substantial to justify excluding the latter
from the franchise .... [I]t is unquestioned that all residents of Phoenix, property
owners and nonproperty owners alike, have a substantial interest in the public
facilities and the services available in the city and will be substantially affected
by the ultimate outcome of the bond election at issue in this case.
Id. at 209. To further justify the holding that the scheme was unconstitutional, he
noted that although the property tax was levied directly against the owners of the
property, a lessee was the party to ultimately bear the burden of the tax. He stated:
Property taxes may be paid initially by property owners, but a significant
part of the ultimate burden of each year's tax on rental property will very likely be
borne by the tenant rather than the landlord since, as the parties also stipulated
in the case, the landlord will treat the property tax as a business expense and
normally will be able to pass all or a large part of this cost on to the tenants in
the form of higher rent. Since most city residents not owning their own homes
are lessees of dwelling units, virtually all residents share the burden of property
taxes imposed and used to service general obligation bonds.
Id. at 210-11. Hence, the Court concluded that the exclusion of those who did not
pay property tax, did not meet the mandate of the equal protection clause.
58. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, for the majority stated:
Whether classifications allegedly limiting the franchise to those resident citizens "primarily interested" deny those excluded equal protection of the laws
depends, inter alia, on whether all those excluded are in fact substantially less
interested or affected than those the statute includes. In other words, the classifications must be tailored so that the exclusion of appellant and members of his class
is necessary to achieve the articulated state goal.
395 U.S. at 632. In reference to the "state goal," Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated
that this goal must constitute a compelling state interest. It was not necessary to
reach this issue in Kramer since the statute lacked the requisite precision to meet the
mandate of the equal protection clause. It has been recognized that a state can impose
certain restrictions on the ballot, i.e., citizenship, age, and residency requirements,
however, before the Court will recognize the legitimacy of each restriction, it has to
be validated by a compelling state interest. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89
(1965).
59. The Kramer Court stated: "[t]he requirements . . . are not sufficiently
tailored to limiting the franchise to those 'primarily interested' in school affairs to
justify the denial of the franchise to appellant and members of his class." 395 U.S.
at 633. The statute excluded some people who were directly interested in the affairs
of the school district and included some who were merely remotely interested. In
Hadley, however, when a unit exercises powers that generally affect the area, the
entire citizenry must have an equal voice in the vote. Therefore, even if a voter was
not primarily interested in the election of a given governmental unit, but he was
nonetheless affected by it, he could seemingly invoke the mandate of the equal protection clause. The Court in the instant case left this avenue open when it stated:
It is of course possible that there might be some case in which a State elects
certain functionaries whose duties are so far removed from normal governmental
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The Court also discussed the possibility of appointing trustees citing
Sailors v. Board of Education6 ° in which it held a system for the appointment of administrative officials to be valid. In Sailors, the Court had
reasoned that the equal protection clause was not violated when a local
unit instituted a system where non-legislative officials, i.e., administrative,
were appointed since the selection of the officials did not involve an election. The Court upheld the system even though each appointee did not
represent an equal number of people. While the appointment of administrative officials seems to be a viable alternative it is clear that the Court
was not proposing a mass change from elected to appointed officials.
Since the Sailors opinion however, is limited to the appointment of
non-legislative officials, the question now arises whether a unit of local
government which has traditionally been elected and undertakes legislative functions could be changed from an electoral to appointive system.
The Court stated in Dusch v. Davis0 x that if it was determined that a
scheme for the selection of officials was being used to evasively avoid the
consequences of reapportionment, invidiously discriminate against a
group, perpetuate certain persons in office, or cancel the voting strength
of a racial or political element of a community, it would strike the scheme
down as being unconstitutional under Reynolds.6 2 It therefore seems that
if a local unit changes to an appointive system to evasively avoid the
impact of Hadley, the Court would strike down the appointive scheme.
The question which remains unanswered, however, is: When a legislative unit is created and the selection of its members is through an appointive scheme, do the appointments have to be made in compliance
with the mandate of the equal protection clause that all those standing
in the same relation to the government unit must be treated equally, which
would in effect require each appointee to represent the same number
of people. 68 If the new unit is legislative in nature, it seems that the
activities and so disproportionately affect different groups that a popular election
in compliance with Reynolds might not be required ...
It is clear, however, that the Court will closely scrutinize the exclusion of a
group from the electoral process since this exclusion results in the denial of an
effective voice in government affairs. Once the electorate is vested with the right to
vote, lines may not be drawn or distinctions made among voters which are inconsistent with the equal protection clause. See Harper v. Virginia Board of Electors,
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
60. 387 U.S. 105 (1967). The Supreme Court upheld a Michigan statute which
provided for the selection of a county school board by a body composed of one
delegate from each of the unequally populated local school districts. The Court concluded the system was valid, reasoning that the selection process was appointive
rather than elective. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, found no constitutional barrier to appointing local bodies performing "essentially administrative
functions ... not legislative in the classical sense." Id. at 110. See 81 HARV. L. REV.
151 (1967); 21 VAND. L. REV. 153 (1967). Cf. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231
(1966), noted in 19 ArA. L. REV. 461 (1967).
61. See Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967), wherein the Court pointed out
that it would strike down any plan that was being used to invidiously discriminate
against a group.
62. Id. at 116.
63. It is clear that if an administrative official is appointed, there is no threat of
an equal protection violation, because of the nature of the office, i.e., non-representative, and there is no election, so the electorates' vote can not be diluted. Should a
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answer to this question should be that if the unit has a substantial impact on the citizens subject to its jurisdiction through the implementation
of its legislative powers, the appointments should be made in compliance
with population equality. 64 This result stems from the premise that the

concept of legislative functions is inseparable from representation c5 and
inherent to the nature of representation is equal protection."6
If this proposition is accepted, the crucial question on the local level
is whether a government unit is legislative in nature. The complexities of this question are compounded when consideration is given to the
fact that most local units undertake a number of legislative and administrative functions at the same time. Since Sailors stands for the
proposition that the appointment of administrative officials does not have
to comply with the equal protection clause, and assuming the appointment of legislative officials does have to comply with the equal protection clause, the Court will again have to enter the quagmire of making
a distinction between which units are legislative and which are administrative through an evaluation of the quantity, nature, and impact of unit
functions. 67 Although the Court could avoid this problem in the instant
case because of its determination that once there is an election, the equal
protection clause must be complied with, it seems inevitable that the
Court will be forced to make this distinction, if the aforementioned
proposition is accepted and the alternative of appointing officials is widely
implemented.
governmental unit attempt to appoint a legislative official, the Court would be forced
to make a distinction between legislative and administrative capacities in order to
determine whether there would be an equal protection clause violation because the
"one man, one vote" principle is not substantially complied with.
This proposition is not meant to imply that all officials, regardless of their
function, can be appointed. This question has yet to be presented to the Court, hence
it must remain unanswered for the present. Mr. Justice Fortas, however, in a dissenting opinion in Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 242 (1966), touched upon this
question. Fortson v. Morris involved the question of the constitutionality of a Georgia
election scheme for gubernatorial elections. The Georgia constitution provided that
if no single candidate for governor received the majority of the votes cast in the
general election, the majority of the Georgia General Assembly would elect the
governor from the two candidates who received the highest number of votes, without
regard necessarily being given to the will of the electorate which each assemblyman
represented. The majority held the scheme constitutional. However, Mr. Justice
Fortas suggested that the implications of the constitutional guarantee of a republican
form of government requires that a governor be elected by popular vote. If this
proposition is accepted in the future, it could force the Court to declare that certain
state officials must be elected and the alternative of appointing the officials would
be foreclosed.
64. See McKay, supra note 29, at 737.
65. See 53 VA. L. REV. 953, 965 (1967).
66. 377 U.S. at 561-68.
67. This distinction may be somewhat easier if the local unit is delegated its
powers through a constitutional provision for home rule, since the local unit, i.e., city
council, would then be immune from state legislative interference. If this is the case,
the local unit is a viable entity rather than an administrative arm of the state legislature through which state initiated programs and proposals are carried out. See
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. at 481, wherein Mr. Justice White briefly focused
on the significance of home rule provisions. If the local unit is governed by home
rule, an analogy can be drawn between the local unit and the state legislature, since
both bodies would receive their power from a delegation of the people. This analogy
could be used to strengthen the proposition that the local unit is legislative in nature.
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One issue which the Court failed to resolve in Hadley is whether
an apportionment scheme based upon total enumeration - those between the age of six and twenty in the instant case - is constitutional
or whether actual population figures must be the basis for apportionment.
In Burns v. Richardson,68 the Supreme Court held that apportionment
based on the number of registered voters residing in the area satisfied
the equal protection clause "only because on this record it was found to
have produced a distribution of legislators not substantially different
from that which would have resulted from the use of a permissible
population basis".6 9 If, therefore, the result of using the total enumeration figure is not substantially similar to that achieved by use of the actual
population figure, the Court might declare the apportionment basis unconstitutional because voting equality would be diluted. Although this is
a test which the Court might have employed, there was no necessity in
the instant case to reach this determination since the entire apportionment scheme was declared unconstitutional.
In conclusion, the instant case resolves the question of whether all
elective units of government are subject to the "one man, one vote"
principle. In rejecting the proposals that, for apportionment purposes,
distinctions should be made on the basis of the purpose, nature, or importance of the election, the Court has made it clear that all units of local
government must insure voting equality. Furthermore, by requiring that
a unit of government need only exercise minimum governmental power,
the Court has clarified a controversy that arose from the "general powers"
test espoused in the Avery decision. With the growing importance of the
special-function unit in local government operations, the burden placed
on the state by Hadley is minimal when compared with the resulting
gain in voting equality.
Michael J. Shepard
68. 384 U.S. 73 (1966). The Supreme Court approved an apportionment plan
for the state legislature of Hawaii in which registered voter figures rather than total
population figures were used as the basis for apportionment. See 52 A.B.A.J. 679
(1966).
69. 384 U.S. at 93. The Court noted that the question of whether total population
is the only valid standard for apportionment purposes has been carefully left open.
In Reynolds, the Court recognized "the right of a citizen to equal representation
and to have his vote weighed equal with all other citizens ..
" Thus Reynolds does
not require the state to include aliens, transients, or short term residents. See also
W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1963).
It is clear that total population is not the only standard, but it should be noted
that the Court has allowed variations only where they provide for a greater degree of
equality. In Burns, apportionment was based on registered voters in an attempt to
compensate for the large number of military personnel in Hawaii. This fact could
distinguish Burns from the instant case because it is not apparent from the facts of
the instant case that the total enumeration standard was used in an attempt to secure
a higher degree of equality. See 384 U.S. at 90-95 (1966).
Hadley can be further distinguished from Burns because the voters in Hadley
were not included in the apportionment basis, whereas in Burns they were. To this
end, it should be noted that those between the age of six and twenty cannot vote, and
it is therefore questionable whether the Court would uphold a statute that excludes
all voters from the basis for apportionment as being constitutional. See generally
Silva, Legislative Representation - With Special Reference To New York, 27 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 408 (1962).
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-- INJUNCTIONS -

NORRIS LA-GUARDIA
COURT FROM

ANTI-INJUNCTION PROVISIONS OF THE

ACT DO NOT PRECLUDE A FEDERAL DISTRICT

ENJOINING A

STRIKE

IN

BREACH

OF A

No-STRIKE

CLAUSE UNDER A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT CONTAINING
A MANDATORY GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE.

Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770
(U.S. 1970)
Litigants were parties to a collective bargaining agreement which contained a mandatory grievance procedure.' A dispute developed over division of work which the parties were unable to settle. The union called
a strike and set up a picket line.
The employer was granted a temporary restraining order in California
Superior Court enjoining continuation of the strike. The union removed
the case to federal district court where the order was affirmed and the
union was ordered to submit the dispute to arbitration. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, relying upon Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson,2 dissolved the injunction.
On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that Sinclair was erroneously decided and reversed the court of appeals holding that the antiinjunction provisions of the Norris La-Guardia Act 3 do not preclude a
federal district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike obligation under a collective bargaining agreement when that agreement contains provisions, enforceable under section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,4 for binding arbitration of the grievance dispute
from which the strike arose. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
The Norris La-Guardia Act attempted to correct the imbalance of
power between management and the unions which existed before its
passage. Section 4 of the Act 5 was specifically designed to prevent the
1. 398 U.S. 237, 238 n.3 (1970).

2. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964), provides in pertinent part:

Sec. 4. No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case
growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons
or interested in such dispute . . . from doing, whether singly or in
of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in
of employment;

to issue any
involving or
participating
concert, any
any relation

4. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964), provides:
Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964). See note 3 supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970

29

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 8

NOVEMBER 1970]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

federal courts from issuing injunctions. The impetus for passage of the
Act was the high incidence of ex parte injunctions issued by a judiciary
which was largely management oriented." Congress recognized that the
indiscriminate issuance of injunctions was a decided deterrent to the
growth of unionism in America.
More than a decade later, Congress acted to move the pendulum back
to the side of management and passed the Labor-Management Relations
Act (Taft-Hartley Act). Section 301(a) of the Act provides for judicial
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements in federal courts. 7
A relatively limited body of law formed around section 301 (a) until
the Court decided Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills8 in which it
was held that section 301(a) was not merely procedural. It authorized
federal courts to fashion a body of substantive federal law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. 9
Subsequently, in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, ° the Court took
the position that the mandate to the federal courts contained in Lincoln
Mills did not give them exclusive jurisdiction over section 301 (a) suits.
State courts, it was held, retained concurrent jurisdiction but must use
federal substantive law in deciding section 301 (a) cases."
The Court also began to create a body of federal substantive law for
the resolution of disputes which might arise concerning collective bargaining agreements. In three cases which came to be known as the
Steelworkers' Trilogy,12 arbitration was designated as the foundation
of federal labor law policy.' 3 In these cases the Court also defined the
interrelationship between the courts and the arbitrator when a dispute
concerning contractual interpretation arises.' 4
6. See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 53-60 (1930).
See also Milk Wagon Driver's Union, Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc.,
311 U.S. 91, 102 (1940).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964). See note 4 supra.
8. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
9. Id. at 451.
10. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
11. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962), in which
the Court said: "[Tihe subject matter of § 301(a) 'is peculiarly one that calls for
uniform law'."
The Court also held that a no-strike clause was the quid pro quo for the
agreement of the employer to submit to final and binding arbitration and therefore
was implied in the collective bargaining agreement if the dispute was arbitrable.

Id. at 106.

12. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)

United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574

(1960) ; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960). See also Torrington Co. v. Metal Products Worker's Union, 362 F.2d
677 (2d Cir. 1966).
13. See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960), in which the Court stated:
The present federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization through the
collective bargaining agreement. A major factor in achieving industrial peace is
the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement.
14. Id. at 382. The Court restricts itself to determining whether the grievance is
arbitrable within the terms of the contract and if the arbitrator has made an award,
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In SinclairRefining Co. v. Atkinson" the Court concluded that section
4 of the Norris La-Guardia Act prohibited the federal courts from enjoining strikes which were in breach of a collective bargaining agreement
containing a mandatory arbitration procedure. Although Sinclair was
considered to be a step backward from the trend of the Court favoring
complete enforceability of collective bargaining agreements under section 301,18 employers were not completely foreclosed from obtaining injunctive relief since the Court did not decide whether the proscriptions
of Norris La-Guardia extended to actions brought in state courts. Most
state courts had determined that, in the absence of an express statutory
command divesting them of the power, they retained the right to issue
7
injunctions.'
Finally, in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 73518 the Court upheld removal
to federal courts of section 301(a) actions initiated in state courts. 10
However, this decision left two important questions unanswered. They
are: (1) whether federal courts were bound to dissolve injunctions which
had been issued by a state court before removal; and (2) whether state
courts were foreclosed by Sinclairfrom issuing injunctions.2 0 The immediwhether
made to
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

he acted within the jurisdiction conferred by the contract. No attempt is
consider the merits of grievance.
370 U.S. 195 (1962).
Id. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See note 34 infra.
390 U.S. 557 (1968).
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964), provides in pertinent part:
Actions removable generally.
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to
the citizenship or residence of the parties ....
The court held that a section 301 (a) suit is within the "original jurisdiction"

of the district court within the meaning of the removal statute. 390 U.S. at 560.
Since it distinguished the nature of relief available after jurisdiction attaches from the
question of whether the court had jurisdiction over the controversy; the court could
retain jurisdiction even though it was prohibited by Sinclair from granting the requested relief.
20. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557, 562 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Stewart commented that there is a need to reconsider Sinclair. Some commentators agreed that Sinclair should be overruled. See Aaron, Strikes in Breach of
Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions, 63 COLUas. L. REV. 1027 (1963) ;
Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 292 (1963) ; Bakaly
& Pepe, And After Avco, 20 LAB. L.J. 67 (1969) ; Edwards & Bergmann, The Legal
and PracticalRemedies Available to Employers to Enforce a Contractual "No Strike"
Commitment, 21 LAB. L.J. 3 (1970) ; Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and
No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco and Beyond, 15 VILL. L. REV. 32
(1969) ; Kiernan, Availability of Injunctions Against Breaches of No-Strike Agreements in Labor Contracts, 32 ALBANY L. REV. 303 (1968) ; P. Wellington, The
No-Strike Clause and the Labor Injunction: Time for a Re-examination, 30 U. PITT.
L. REV. 293 (1968). Other commentators thought that Sinclair should be extended
to the states. See Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301: The Patchwork of Avco
and PhiladelphiaMarine on the Fabric of National Labor Policy, 69 COLUm. L. REV.
980 (1969) ; Dunau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REV. 427 (1969).
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ate effect of Avco was the removal to federal courts of the vast majority
of suits which were seeking to enjoin a strike in breach of a no-strike
commitment.

21

In the instant case, in deciding to overrule Sinclair, the Court was
confronted initially with a stare decisis issue of heightened significance,
both, because of the short span of time between Sinclair and Boys
Markets and the sensitive nature of labor relations. Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, balanced the accepted reasons for adhering to
stare decisis 22 against his belief that Sinclair was an aberration in an otherwise "[c]onsistent emphasis upon the congressional policy to promote the
peaceful settlement of labor disputes through arbitration ....*23 and thereby summarily disposed of the issue. Justice Brennan designated Avco as
the principal impetus underlying the reconsideration of Sinclair,finding that
after Avco, ". . . Sinclair does not make a viable contribution to federal
' 24
labor policy."

Justice Black, in his dissent, posited that stare decisis barred reconsideration of Sinclair, reasoning that once the Court makes the initial
interpretation of a statute, it exhausts its jurisdiction and further modifications can only be made by the legislature, 2 absent an exceptional case
containing exceptional circumstances. Justice Black did not think Avco
was such a change arguing that it is in "no way inconsistent with Sinclair."'26 Moreover, Justice Black distinguished reinterpretation of a constitutional decision from reinterpretation of a decision in which the Court
had construed a statute.2 7 The latter, he thought, was impermissible. The
Court has not, however, generally adhered to this distinction, 28 and has
been inclined to re-examine decisions which interpreted the substantive
See also Comment, Enjoining Violations of the No-Strike Clause, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
1130, 1138 (1967).
21. Cf. Edwards & Bergmann, supra note 20, at 13.
22. See Moragne v. States Marine, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970).
23. 398 U.S. at 241.
24. 398 U.S. at 249. But it is possible to argue that Avco enhanced rather than
undermined the validity of Sinclair. By extending, in effect, the proscriptions of
Sinclair to the states the Court was emphasizing, in accord with the Norris La-Guardia
Act, that injunctive relief was not a favored remedy for resolving labor disputes.
25. Cf. Kaufman, A Defense of Stare Decisis, 10 HAST. L.J. 283, 287 (1959).
Justice Kaufman advocated extending the exhaustion of jurisdiction analysis to constitutional decisions. But ef. Szanton, Stare Decisis: A Dissenting View, 10 HAST.
L.J. 394 (1959).
26. Justice Black commented that:
The Court must recognize that the holding of Avco is in no way inconsistent
with Sinclair. As we said in Avco ... : "The nature of the relief available after
jurisdiction attaches is, of course, different from the question whether there is
jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy." The Court contends, however, that
the result of the two cases taken together is the "anomalous situation" that nostrike clauses become unenforceable in state courts, and this is inconsistent with
"an important goal of our national labor policy."
398 U.S. at 260.
27. Justice Black would reinterpret a constitutional question because the only way
to correct an erroneous decision of the Court is by constitutional amendment. On the
other hand, it is relatively easy for Congress to amend a statute to remedy a misinterpretation by the Court. 398 U.S. at 259.
28. See generally Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735 (1949).
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provisions of a statute, even without a change in circumstances. 29 Justice
Black also reasoned that in an area such as labor relations which has
powerful and antagonistic interest groups the Court has a duty to act
conservatively and leave major substantive revisions of the law to Congress. Congress, in Justice Black's view, had been invited to act and having
0
refused to do so the Court should respect its silence.3
The majority rejected this contention, citing the absence of any clear
indicia of congressional acceptance of Sinclair and the "treachery" that
inheres in accepting congressional silence alone as controlling.2 ' It can be
argued, however, that the real reason for the court's reconsideration of
Sinclair was that it thought arbitration, the "kingpin" of federal labor law
policy, was so threatened after Avco as to make immediate remedial action
imperative. Consequently, stare decisis arguments, however compelling,
could not deter them.
The Court, in characterizing the anomalous situation produced by
Avco, recognized that section 301 (a), which was enacted to increase the
remedies available to the employer, was being used to limit them.3 2 Since
the union could remove a section 301 (a) action from a state court if
injunctive relief was being sought, the employer could lose his right to the
state court forum; a right that had existed prior to Avco. Justice Brennan
thought that this was inapposite to the conclusion of the Court in Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney33 that in section 301 (a) cases federal courts
were to supplement and not pre-empt the pre-existing jurisdiction of the
state courts. Further, with the unanswered questions left by Avco, there
remained the possibility of forum shopping by employers seeking to avoid
the Norris La-Guardia Act. This could lead to undesirable results. For
example, when the multi-state employer was involved in a strike it was
29. See United States v. Phelps, 107 U.S. 300 (1882), overruling Shelton v.

Collector, 72 U.S. 113 (1866); Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575 (1943),

over.'dini United States Bd. Merchant Fleet Corp. v. Livingston, 280 U.S. 320 (1930).
In B: a. the Court, reinterpreting "The Suits in Admiralty Act," held that it did not
prov,. , tLe exclusive remedy against a private company for a tort committed during
its op ation of a government vessel under an agency agreement. Nye v. United States,
313 TJ.S. 33 (1941), overruling Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402
(19.S). The Court in Nye held that the term "so near thereto" in section 268 of the
Judic-a' Code (which gave federal courts the power to punish contempts who
obstructed the administration of justice) had a geographical and not a causal connection to the implementation of justice in the courts. But see Justice Stone dissenting
in Nye v. United States ". . . I think the responsibility of departing from the long
acceoted construction of this statute should be left to the legislative branch of the
government to which it rightfully belongs." 313 U.S. at 57. See also Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 487, 513 (1940); Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346
U.S. 356 (1953).
30. Bills have been introduced in Congress which would have effected legislative
reversal of Sinclair. See S. Doc. No. 107, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2455 (1967) ; H.R.
6080, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) ; H.R. 12127, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
The Section of Labor Law of the American Bar Association also suggested
that Congress undo Sinclair. PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOcIATION LABOR RELATIONS LAW - PART II, 226 (1963).
31. 398 U.S. at 241.
32. See Kiernan, supra note 20, at 316. See also McCarroll v. Los Angeles County
Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 63, 315 P.2d 322, 332 (1957).
33. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
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possible that he would be able to effectively enjoin the union from striking
in one state but be unable to do so in another.34 This inconsistency could
arise because of the existence of "little" Norris La-Guardia Acts in some
states, and although most state courts have circumvented such legislation
by holding that a strike in breach of a collective bargaining agreement
which has a mandatory grievance procedure is not a "labor dispute" within
the meaning of such statutes, 5 others have not, 36 thus refusing to grant
injunctive relief. The Court could have remedied this situation either by
making injunctions available to the employer in federal courts, thereby
avoiding the problem in states which had applicable "little" Norris LaGuardia Acts, or by extending Sinclair to the states.
The rationale underlying the latter decision is that Lincoln Mills purported to establish a uniform system of labor law for the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements. Sinclair answered in the negative the
question whether as a part of this uniform system Congress intended the
federal courts to have the power to grant injunctions. Therefore, it follows that in the interest of uniformity the anti-injunction sections of the
Norris La-Guardia Act should be made applicable to the states.3 The
argument that in so doing the Court would subvert section 301 by weakening existing remedial authority has been condemned as irrelevant because
of the inherent federal character of the right 33 to enforce collective bar39
gaining agreements.
The initial difficulty with this line of reasoning is the question whether
a state court when enforcing a federal right must limit itself to granting
remedies available in federal courts.4 0 In McCarroll v. Los Angeles
County District Council of Carpenters,41 an employer brought an action
seeking to enjoin a strike in breach of a no-strike obligation in the col-

lective bargaining agreement. Justice Traynor doubted whether Congress
has the power to control equitable remedies available in state courts when
that court is enforcing a federal right. He reasoned that "[a] state court
34. See Bartosic, supra note 20, at 1007.
35. See, e.g., N.Y. LABOR LAW § 808 (McKinney 1965), construed in C.D. Perry
& Sons, Inc. v. Robolitto, 39 Misc. 2d 147, 240 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1963), aff'd, 23 App.
Div. 2d 949, 260 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1965).
36. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 65 (1964), construed in Tidewater Express Lines, Inc. v. Freight Drivers Local No. 557, 230 Md. 450, 187 A.2d 685 (1963).
37. See American Dredging Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 338
F.2d 837, 857 (3d Cir. 1964) (Hastie, J., dissenting) ; Independent Workers v. Socony
Mobil Oil Co., 85 N.J. Super. 453, 205 A.2d 78 (1964), in which the court held that
Sinclair was binding on the issue in New Jersey; Aaron, supra note 20, at 1039.
38. See Dunau, supra note 20, at 471.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964). See note 4 supra.
40. See McCarroll v,Los Angeles County Dist. of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45,
60-63, 315 P.2d 322, 330-32 (1957), in which Justice Traynor forsaw Sinclair and
many of the problems it could cause; Shaw Electric Co. v. Electrical Workers, Local
98, 418 Pa. 1, 10-11, 208 A.2d 769, 774-75. But see Aaron, supra note 20, at 1031-32,
where the author suggests that if Congress has the power to pre-empt an area, and
completely exclude state jurisdiction, it also has the power to limit the remedy available. The only question remaining was whether an implication of Sinclair was that
Congress had done so.
41. 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957).
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enforcing a federal right is not simply another federal court. ' 42 Justice
Traynor also thought that "a strong argument could be made that Congress must take the state courts as it finds them in regard to the availability of equitable remedies, and can require only that they not discrimi' 43
nate against litigants enforcing federal rights.
Casting further doubt on the propriety of extending Sinclair to the
states is the lack of affirmative evidence, in the legislative history, as well
as the substantive provisions of the Norris La-Guardia Act, that such
an alternative was considered by Congress. For example, both section 2,
which contains the declaration of policy of the Act, and section 4, the antiinjunction provision, refer exclusively to "courts of the United States"
(emphasis supplied). Section 13(d) defines "Court of the United States"
as:
Any court of the United States whose jurisdiction has been or
may be conferred or defined or limited by Act of Congress ....
,
There is no indication that Congress at any time considered the Norris
45
La-Guardia Act to effect other than federal courts.

The majority in Boys Markets was more concerned with the practical
ramifications of extending Sinclair to the states than a possible lack of
justification if the Court decided in favor of that alternative.
Justice Brennan reasoned that extending Sinclair to the states was not
a viable alternative because of the devastating effect such a decision
would have on the enforcement of mandatory grievance procedures in collective bargaining agreements. Although other remedies exist for enforcement, the majority felt that injunctive relief was the most compelling incentive for entering into such contracts. This incentive, said the court....
"is necessarily dissipated if the principal and most expeditious method by

'46
which the no-strike obligation can be enforced is eliminated.
The importance of injunctive relief to the employer has been widely
debated. 47 If one accepts the position of the majority, it would follow that the incidence of mandatory grievance procedures in collective bargaining agreements would decrease after the Sinclair decision.
Although empirical evidence is inconclusive, it would seem that the
opposite took place. 48 But even if one embraces the Court's contention that employers have less incentive to enter into collective bargaining
agreements containing mandatory grievance procedures if judicial injunc-

42. Id. at 62, 315 P.2d at 331.
43. Id. at 62, 315 P.2d at 331.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 113(d) (1964). See also American Dredging Co. v. Marine
Div. Int'l Union of Eng'rs, 338 F.2d 837, 851-56 (3d Cir. 1964).
45. See Marine Cooks & Stewards, AFL v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365
(1960); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R., 321 U.S. 50, 58,
63-64 (1944) ; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941) ; Milk Wagon
Driver's Union, Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940),
46. 398 U.S. at 248 (emphasis added).
47. See, e.g., Bartosic, supra note 20, at 1000. But see, e.g., P. Wellington, supra
note 20, at 306; H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 118 (1968).
48. See also B.N.A. LAB. REL. EXPEDITER 94 (1970).
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tive relief is not available, the decision to overrule Sinclair,without a legislative mandate, can still be questioned. Prior to the decision in the instant
case there were a variety of effective remedies available to the employer
which might mollify the unavailability of injunctive relief and persuade
him to include a mandatory arbitration provision in his contract. 49
Potentially the most effective remedy available to the employer after
Avco was the establishment of a "speedy" arbitration procedure whereby
an arbitral award ordering the union to cease and desist from the strike
in breach of a no-strike clause could be obtained shortly after the strike
began. The situation in which the court enforces an arbitral award which
has the effect of enjoining a strike has been distinguished from enjoining
a strike when the action is initiated in the judicial system on the theory
that an arbitration award derives its authority from the voluntary agreement of the parties to the labor contract rather than from substantive
federal labor law as such. 50
A more persuasive argument is that section 4 of the Norris LaGuardia Act is not applicable to judicial enforcement of arbitration awards
because it is limited to prohibiting injunctions which are issued to enjoin
"labor disputes." In New Orleans Steamship Association v. Longshore
Workers Local 1418,51 an employer was granted a mandatory injunction
enforcing an arbitration award which ordered the union to desist from
a work stoppage in violation of the no-strike provision in the contract.
The court did not consider the controversy a "labor dispute" within the
meaning of the Norris La-Guardia Act. The court, stated that:
We have before us a contract wherein the parties have ceded
their remedy of self-help in a labor dispute to arbitration even to the
point of permitting the arbitrator to grant a desist order. Once the
arbitration was completed; the matter becomes ripe for specific per52
formance and fell outside the scope of Norris La-Guardia.
It is arguable that the Court should have decided whether the Norris
La-Guardia Act precluded federal courts from enforcing a cease and desist
award issued by an arbitrator pursuant to a no-strike clause in the contract,
before deciding to overrule Sinclair. If the Court decided that such awards
are enforceable it could effectuate its goal of assuring the availability of
49. See generally Edwards & Bergmann, supra note 20; Fairweather, Employer
Actions and Options in Response to Strikes in Breach of Contract, 18 N.Y.U. CONF.
LAB. 129 (1966).
50. See Keene, supra note 20, at 55. For cases favoring the right of the courts to
enforce arbitration awards, see generally New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. Longshore
Workers, Local 1418, 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 929 (1968);
Local 1291, I.L.A. v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 365 F.2d 295 (3d Cir. 1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 64 (1967). But see Meyer, Enforcement of Arbitrator's Labor Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 7 How. L.J. 31 (1961); Vladeck,
Injunctive Relief Against Strikes in Breach of the Labor Agreement, 16 N.Y.U.
CONF. LAB. 289, 294 (1963).
51. 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 929 (1968).
52. 389 F.2d at 372.
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injunctive relief to the employer without subjecting itself to the criticism
that it had improperly pre-empted a function of the legislative branch.
Perhaps the most widely used remedy is an action for damages. However, the majority looked upon this form of relief with disfavor contending
that "an action for damages prosecuted during or after a labor dispute
would only tend to agravate industrial strife and delay an early resolution of the difficulties between employer and union.15 3 Nonetheless, the
possibility of a large award exacted from a union is often a great deterrent
to a strike, especially if the union is not financially prepared to satisfy
54
a prodigious judgment.
Exemplary damages, which would have a decided effect on a union's
decision to strike in breach of a no-strike clause, have been held to be a
permissible remedy for the courts to grant under section 301(a).5, Even
if a court will not award punitive damages, the possibility remains that it
will enforce an award of an arbitrator who did award them. Furthermore,
it is still possible to get a case remanded to the state court after it has
been removed to the federal court in the limited situation where all parties
did not join in the removal action.5 6 Hypothetically, the state court could
then grant an injunction. However, in most labor disputes, expeditious
treatment of the case is essential and by the time the case is remanded
the need for the injunction may have dissipated.
The employer could also resort to self-help by discharging any employee who took part in a strike in breach of a no-strike provision in the
contract. The right to discharge an employee in these circumstances is
clearly established. 5 7 An employee's participation in an unlawful strike is
not a protected concerted activity, 58 nor is firing him in response thereto
53. 398 U.S. at 248.
54. Damages have been measured by the loss of profits due to delay caused by
the work stoppages and the overtime costs incurred in recovering the lost time, Alcoa
S.S. Co. v. Conerford, 25 L.R.R.M. 2199 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); prospective damages
occasioned by loss of customers and other natural consequences of the strike, W.L.
Mead v. Teamsters Local 25, 129 F. Supp. 313 (D. Mass. 1955), aff'd, 203 F.2d 576
(1st Cir. 1956) ; overhead and standby expenses, Structural Steel Ornamental Iron
Ass'n v. Shopmen's Local Union, 172 F. Supp. 352 (D.N.J. 1959) ; and the fair rental
value of machines idled by the strike, Denver Bldg. Trades Council v. Shore, 132 Colo.
187, 287 P.2d 267 (1955).
The employer has the duty to mitigate as well as to prove that the union was
responsible for the breach. The union can successfully defend an action for damages
brought under section 301 by establishing that the strike was an unauthorized "wildcat" by the dissatisfied workers, which the union neither incited nor encouraged.
However, the employer can prove "authorization" by circumstantial evidence. See
United Textile Workers v. Newberry Mills, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 366 (D.S.C. 1965).
55. See S. Wanzer & Sons, Inc. v. Milk Driver's Local 753, 249 F. Supp. 664
(N.D. Ill.
1967), noted in 80 HARV. L. REV. 903 (1967). But see United Shoe Workers
v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 187 F. Supp. 509, 512-13 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
56. See Global Foods, Inc. v. Dworet, 55 CCH LAB. L. REP. fr 11,856 (S.D.N.Y.
1967). Case was remanded to state court because the individual defendants (who
were taking part in a wildcat strike) did not persuade the union (who was also being
sued) to join in the removal petition.
57. Southwest Banana Distribs., Inc. v. South At. & Gulf Coast Dist., Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 55 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1964).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
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an unfair labor practice if the employer had no other motive in so doing. 9
The general right of the employer to discharge employees will probably be
limited by the arbitrator who will examine a variety of circumstances before deciding on its reasonableness.60 This is especially true when the employer discharges selectively, but this result can be avoided by a well
drafted no-strike clause expressly allowing the employer to do so.
The majority in Boys Markets balanced the available remedies against
the importance of injunctive relief to the employer and concluded that
Sinclair must be overruled. Justice Black thought that if the remedies
available to the employer were insufficient, Congress - and not the
Court - should act to correct the situation.
The Court, in the instant case, limited the holding to enjoining a strike
in breach of a collective bargaining agreement containing a mandatory
grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure. 61 The Court took pains to
emphasize, however, that injunctive relief was not to be granted as a matter
of course. Rules were set forth for the district courts to use in determining the propriety of issuing an injunction in a specific case. The courts
must make the following determinations: (1) is there a mandatory grievance procedure in the contract; (2) is the dispute arbitrable within the
terms of the agreement; (3) they must order the employer to arbitrate
as a condition of obtaining the injunction; and (4) they must apply ordinary principles of equity 62 in considering whether the injunction is
63

warranted.
In an attempt to minimize the import of its decision, the Court commented that this holding is a narrow one and does not serve to vitiate the
vitality of the Norris La-Guardia Act. 64 To the extent that the case is
limited to a specific contract embodying a specific provision, it is indeed
a narrow decision. However, because of the number of contracts that
include such a clause it cannot be disputed that the case, in its impact upon
the area of collective bargaining, is quite broad. Moreover, since the
Court has adopted the posture that arbitration is the preferred method of
settling labor disputes and that injunctive relief greatly enhances the effectiveness of arbitration, it would indeed be anomalous if it intended the hold59. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
60. See Fairweather, supra note 48, at 174, in which the author catalogues the
following circumstances which arbitrators have considered in deciding the propriety
of an employee's dismissal: (1) the familiarity of the employee with his obligation;
(2) the past practice of the employer; (3) the extent of participation; (4) the status
of the employee in the union organization; and (5) the cause of the strike.
61. 398 U.S. at 253.
62. 398 U.S. at 254.
63. The Court itemizes these as:

"...

whether breaches are occurring and will

continue, or have been threatened and will be committed; whether they have caused
or will cause irreparable injury to the employer; and whether the employer will
suffer more from the denial of an injunction than will the union from its issuance."
398 U.S. at 254. See also W.

KERR,

A

TREATISE ON

THE LAW AND

PRACTICE OF

16-32 (1914).
64. 398 U.S. at 253.

INJUNCTION
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ing of Boys Markets to be restrictively interpreted. The position that the
vitality of the Norris La-Guardia Act has not been undermined is questionable. The Court has made the first major intrusion into section 4 by
allowing injunctions, contrary to the literal reading of the anti-injunction
provision. Further, the Court posited that the underlying rationale of the
Norris La-Guardia Act is outmoded. This can be seen as a judicial
invitation to Congress to rescind it.
Perhaps the most formidable issue the Court was confronted with in
the instant case was the problem of reconciling the inconsistent provisions
of section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act and section 4
of the Norris La-Guardia Act. 65 While not inconsistent on its face, as
applied to the remedy federal courts can fashion in section 301 (a) suits,
section 4 does present an obstacle. The theory of judicial accommodation - reading the two statutes together in order to effectuate the underlying policies of both - was employed to resolve the question. At the outset, Justice Brennan noted that the Norris La-Guardia Act, passed in 1932,
was born of a different age, created to protect the nascent labor movement from a situation that was ".

.

. totally different from that which

60

Subsequently, the emphasis of Congress (and the Court)
exists today."
was on establishing procedures whereby industrial disputes could be resolved with as little strain as possible on the collective bargaining relationship. This was the framework in which section 301 (a) was enacted.
To support its accommodation argument the Court relied on Brotherhood of RailroadTrainmen v. Chicago River IndustrialRailroad67 in which
it concluded that federal courts, notwithstanding the Norris La-Guardia
Act, may enjoin strikes over disputes as to the interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement since the Railway Labor Act 68 compelled
the union to submit "minor disputes" to the National Railroad Adjustment Board for settlement.69 The Court's decision was an accommodation
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964), with 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
398 U.S. at 250.
353 U.S. 30 (1957).
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964).
69. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1964), provides in pertinent part:

65.
66.
67.
68.

First: There is established a Board, to be known as the 'National
Adjustment Board" . . ..

Railroad

'(i) The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier
or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application
of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions . . . shall be
handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of
the carrier designated to handle such disputes; the disputes may be referred . . .
to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the
facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes.
(i ". • •A copy of the awards shall be furnished to the respective parties
to the controversy, . . . the awards shall be final and binding upon both parties
to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award ...
But see Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 362 U.S. 330 (1960),
in which the Court precluded injunctive relief from being granted against strikes over
"major disputes."
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of the Norris La-Guardia Act with the Railway Labor Act. It reasoned
that the labor movement had been sufficiently protected by the compulsory
arbitration procedures created under the Railway Labor Act and therefore,
in the interest of peaceful settlement of disputes, the Union could be
stripped of its primary weapon - the right to strike. 70 Mr. Justice Brennan thought that the principles elaborated in Chicago River were equally
applicable to the present case. 71 However, Justice Black, speaking for the
majority in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson 72 pointed out that in Chicago
River the strike was called in violation of an affirmative duty to arbitrate
imposed on the union by the Railway Labor Act itself, while in the Sinclair
[and Boys Markets] situation the law does not provide for an exclusive
mandatory method of settling labor disputes, nor is any affirmative duty
imposed upon the parties that would be inconsistent with the proscriptions
of the Norris La-Guardia Act. 73 Unlike the Labor Management Relations

Act, Justice Black could find no indication in the legislative history of the
Railway Labor Act, that Congress specifically rejected proposals to make
the prohibitions of the Norris La-Guardia Act inapplicable to it. 7 4 The
Boys Markets Court did not attach great importance to the distinction that
Chicago River involved arbitration procedures established by statute, reasoning that Congress had put as much significance on voluntary, as on
compulsory agreements to arbitrate. 75
The propriety of accommodation raises questions regarding the interrelationship between the judicial and legislative branches of government. 76
The proposition has been espoused that although the Court has a duty to
accommodate conflicting statutes, 77 there are times when it should refrain
from doing so in order to preserve its proper function in our tripartite
system of government. One such situation is when the Court, as in the
instant case, is asked to decide a highly sensitive political issue which Congress is better able to resolve but has not done so. 78
70. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River Indus. R.R., 353 U.S. 30,
41 (1957).
71. 398 U.S. at 252.

72. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
73. Id. at 211.

74. Id.
75. 398 U.S. at 252.

76. These questions are similar to those raised in discussing the stare decisis
issue, p. 179 supra.
77. See H. Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political
Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1551 (1963), where
the contention is made that:
To assume that accommodation or reconciliation of apparently conflicting
statutes is work only for the legislature is to ignore the dynamics of the legislative process. The problem, as it comes to the court, may have been unforeseeable
at the time of legislative deliberation. It may have been overlooked. It may have
been thought too unimportant to occupy the time of very busy men.
78. See H. Wellington, supra note 74, at 1562. But see P. Wellington, supra
note 20, at 304, where the author states that:
The Court has a creative role to play in those areas of the law where federal
legislation is passed only with great difficulty and on an infrequent basis. Labor
law is a striking example of such an area .
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The rationale is that in these areas the representative bodies are the
proper place in which to determine the issue. On the other hand this
position has been criticized because it views courts as merely dispute settlers
and imposes no obligation upon them to reach a settlement that is
"right".79 But the importance of preserving the proper distribution of
power in our system can not be minimized. It is submitted that the Court
may have acted improvidently in deciding Boys Markets even though its
conclusion was "right." Congress has not clearly declared a labor policy
since 1947.80 Since that time the Court has created a system of substantive
labor law which has not as yet been forced to stand the test of empirical
study, legislative debate and investigation, and determination by the representatives of the body politic. Indeed, an examination must be made to
determine whether the system of mandatory arbitration of grievances
has been productive of industrial peace. 8 ' It is doubtful, even if Sinclair
had been extended to the states, whether there would have been a marked
change in the number of collective bargaining agreements containing
mandatory grievance adjustment procedures. It seems reasonable to conclude that once major clauses are included in a labor contract they have a
tendency to remain, absent a catacyslmic change in the relationship between
the parties. In this context it must be emphasized that the employer still
had remedies available to him after Sinclair and Avco which would encourage him not to eliminate the mandatory grievance procedure clause
from his contract.
After Boys Markets the employer and the union will be faced with
the task for redefining the scope of the arbitration clause. If a grievance
is expressly excluded from the arbitration clause the employer will not
be able to seek an injunction if a strike develops over that matter. However, the union leadership will probably not try to severely restrict the
scope of the arbitration clause since they, as well as management, have an
interest in having "wildcat" strikes stopped as expeditiously as possible.
"Wildcats" are detrimental to the relationship that the union leadership has
with management and also undermines their authority with the rank and
file.
Employers will be more amenable to the inclusion of mandatory arbitration provisions in their contracts now that their enforceability is greatly
enhanced.82 It appears likely that unions who have already agreed to
mandatory arbitration procedures will probably continue to acquiesce to
79. See Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation,38 S.

CAL. L. REV. 1, 26 (1964).

80. The Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1964).
81. See H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 117-25 (1968).
Professor Wellington thinks that Lucas Flour should be overruled. He suggests
"neutral" enforcement of collective bargaining agreements by the courts, their role
being to preserve freedom of contract by enforcing the voluntary agreement of the
parties and not to impose their own determinations on how industrial peace can best

be preserved.
82. Cf. P. Wellington, supra note 20, at 306.
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having them included in subsequent collective bargaining agreements, while
those that have not as yet bargained for them may refrain from doing so,
especially if they consider their right to strike to be of particular
importance.
After Avco reconsideration of Sincladr was necessary by the Court.
After Boys Markets a reconsideration, by Congress, of the entire collective bargaining scheme would seem to be compelled.
Laurence E. Hirsch

LABOR LAW

JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD PRECLUDED FROM RESOLVING JURISDICTIONAL DisPUTES WHERE DISPUTING UNIONS HAVE AGREED To SETTLE SUCH
DISPUTES THROUGH BINDING ARBITRATION.

PlasterersLocal 79 v. NLRB (D.C. Cir. 1970)
The Southwestern Construction Company and Martini Tile and
Terrazzo Company brought separate charges of unfair labor practices
against Plasterers Local Union No. 79, Operative Plasterers' and
Cement Masons' International Association, AFL-CIO (Plasterers) alleging that the Plasterers had picketed job sites of each employer with
the object of forcing them to assign work to employees represented
by the Plasterers, in violation of section 8(b) (4) (D) of the National
Labor Relations Act.' The picketing by the Plasterers had been the
result of a "jurisdictional dispute ' 2 between the Plasterers and the Tile,
1. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (D)

(1964), provides:

It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents"(4)'(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage
in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, article, materials,
or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or
restrain any person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce,
where in either case an object thereof is(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or
class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade,
craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work.
2. In Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964), Mr. Justice
Douglas stated that:
[a] "jurisdictional" dispute could be one of two different, though related,
species: either - (1) a controversy as to whether certain work should be performed by workers in one bargaining unit or those in another; or (2) a con-
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Terrazzo, and Marble Setters Local Union No. 20 of the Bricklayers,
Masons, and Plasterers International Union (Tile Setters). By agreement, the unions had submitted the dispute to the National Joint Board
for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes (Joint Board)3 which had
awarded the work in question to the Plasterers. Following the unfair
labor practice charges, the National Labor Relations Board (Board)
held a consolidated hearing, pursuant to section 10(k) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 4 to resolve the jurisdictional dispute and subsequently concluded that the Tile Setters were entitled to the work. 5
When the Plasterers refused to comply with the Board's decision, 6 the
Board issued a complaint against petitioner alleging a violation of section
8(b) (4) (D) of the Act. At the unfair labor practice hearing, the
Board, relying on the record and determinations of the section 10(k)
hearing, found that the Plasterers had committed an unfair labor practroversy as to which union should represent employees doing particular work.

375 U.S. at 263.
"Jurisdictional" disputes are more generally defined, at least by the commentators, as being species (1) above, while species (2) is generally called a
"representative" dispute. See Note, JurisdictionalDisputes Since the C.B.S. Decision,
39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 657, 657 n.2 (1964).
The dispute in the instant case was of the first species and hereinafter a
"jurisdictional" dispute will be used as meaning the first species. The particular dispute in this case involved which of the two unions - Plasterers or Tile Setters should be given the job of applying a coat of mortar on a wall to be tiled.
3. The "Joint Board" is an arbitration panel which was established by the
Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO for the final settlement of
jurisdictional disputes between members of unions affiliated with the Department, the
Plasterers and Tile Setters being so affiliated. Under Article X of the Department's
Constitution, it is provided that all disputes are to be settled according to a plan
established by the Department which "shall be recognized as final and binding upon
the Department and upon all affiliated National and International Unions and their
affiliated locals." The "Plan for National Joint Board for Settlement of Jurisdictional
Disputes" was originally established in 1948, and revised in 1965. Under this Plan,
disputes are processed by a panel comprised of both union and employer members.
Any decision rendered by the panel is nationally effective and "shall be immediately
accepted and complied with by all parties to this Agreement." Brief for Building and
Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae, Plasterers Local 79
v. NLRBF.2d -----(D.C. Cir. 1970). See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON THE BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, 1965-1966 ABA SECTION ON LABOR
RELATIONS PROCEEDINGS 452, 452-53 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT].
4. 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1964), provides in part:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (D) of section 158(b), the Board is
enpowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair
labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after the notice that
such a charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board
satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the
voluntary adjustment of, the dispute ....
5. Plasterers Local 79 (Southwestern Constr. Co.), 167 N.L.R.B. 185 (1967).
6. The final sentence of 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1964), provides:
Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board
or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, [the unfair labor practice]
charge shall be dismissed.
Thus, an unfair labor practice hearing based on an alleged unfair labor practice within the meaning of section 8(b) (4) (D) is held only if one or both of the
unions refuse or fail to comply with the Board's determination of the jurisdictional
dispute. See Mann & Husband, Private and Governmental Plans for the Adjustment
of Interunion Disputes: Work Assignment Conflict to 1949, 13 STAN. L. REv. 5,
53 (1960).
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7
tice in violation of section 8(b) (4) (D) . Proceeding on the Plasterers'
8
petition to review and the Board's cross-petition to enforce the order, 9
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia set
aside the Board's order, 10 holding" that under the "abstention provision"
of section 10(k), the Board may not properly proceed to resolve a
jurisdictional dispute pursuant to that section when the disputing unions
(or employee groups) have agreed to settle their dispute through binding arbitration, regardless of whether the employer who originally assigned the disputed work was a party to such a settlement agreement or
would be bound by the final adjustment of the dispute. 12 Plasterers
Local 79 v. N.L.R.B.-- ---F. 2d ____ (D.C. Cir. 1970).
As a result of increasing public and congressional concern over
work stoppages arising out of jurisdictional disputes, Congress added
sections 8(b) (4) (D) and 10(k) to the National Labor Relations Act

7. Plasterers Local 79 (Southwestern Constr. Co.), 172 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 68
L.R.R.M. 1401 (1968).
The Board has the authority to issue such an order under 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1964), which provides in part:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the
opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in
any unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall
issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to
cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative
action . . . as will effectuate the policies of the subchapter ...
8. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964), provides:
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in
whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order . . . in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such
a court a written petition praying that the order of the Board be modified or
set aside.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964), provides in pertinent part:
The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United
States . . . for the enforcement of such order ....

10. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964), provides in part:
[Tihe court . . . shall have the same jurisdiction to grant to the Board such
temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and in like
manner to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so
modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board ....
11. Prior to adjudicating the instant case on its merits, the court was required
to decide whether or not the case was moot, pursuant to a motion to dismiss filed by
the Tile Setters (intervenors in the instant case). In support of the motion, the Tile
Setters argued that mootness had resulted from the fact that the job upon which the
dispi'ted work was to have been performed had been completed and therefore, that
the Board's cease and desist order proscribed conduct in which it would be impossible
for the Plasterers to engage .......- F.2d at ....... Although it has been held that the
Board may quash a section 10(k) hearing and dismiss the section 8(b) (4) (D) complaint where several ,ears have passed since the work was completed, Tip Top
Roofers, Inc. v. NLRB, 324 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1963), the court here reasoned that
the question of whether an unfair labor practice has occurred is not made moot
simply because the particular job involved has been completed, see Local 74, Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 707, 715 (1951); NLRB v. Plumbers Union
of Nassau County, 299 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1962). The court concluded that in the
instant case, "the controversy [wasi sufficiently broad and enduring [as] to make
appropriate affirmative relief. . . . The case is not moot." .
F.2d at ......
12. Since there is no independent review of § 10(k) work assignments, the only
staze at which the [union] can contest the work award is on review of the
.§ 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor practice order. If the § 10(k) order-falls, the unfair
labor practice order falls with it.
NLRB v. Local 991, International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F42d 66, 71 (5th Cir.
1964).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss1/8

44

Editors: Recent Developments

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 16

as part of the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947.'3 These sections
were included in the Act with the intention of protecting neutral employers from becoming the helpless victims of disputes that did not
concern them. 14 Section 8(b) (4) (D) broadly prohibits such work
stoppages or so-called "jurisdictional strikes""' as being unfair labor
practices, while section 10(k) directs the Board to "hear and determine"
the disputes out of which such strikes have arisen, 16 unless barred from
17
so doing under an "abstention provision.
From the outset, the Board construed its section 10(k) duty to
"hear and determine" jurisdictional disputes narrowly and maintained
that it discharged this duty merely by ascertaining whether the striking
union was entitled to the work in question by reason of an existing
Board order or certification, or by virtue of the terms of a collective
bargaining contract.' If neither existed, the Board reasoned that work
assignments were the employer's prerogative and left the assignment
as it had been made by the employer. 19 Under this reading of section
13. 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1964).
14. NLRB v. Broadcast Eng'rs, Local 1212, 364 U.S. 573, 580-81 (1961).
15. Section 8(b) (4) (D) gives the definition of a "jurisdictional strike" as being:
(A)

strike .

.

. where .

.

. an object thereof is-

(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class
rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade,
craft, or class ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (D) (1964). See note 1 supra.
Generally it is agreed that such language is the definition of a jurisdictional
strike. For a discussion of what conduct is encompassed by this definition, and thereby
proscribed by section 8(b) (4) (D), see Note, Work-Assignment Disputes Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1150, 1151-53 (1960).
16. The intended purpose of section 10(k), in general, was the permanent resolution of jurisdictional disputes so as to prevent future jurisdictional strikes and to
protect "neutral" employers. Therefore, sections 8(b)(4)(D) and 10(k) analyzed
together were intended to prohibit existing strikes and prevent future ones. See Note,
supra note 15, at 1156.
17. The abstention provision in section 10(k) is in the form of an exception to
that section's direction that the Board "hear and determine" jurisdictional disputes
and provides:
[T]he Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute ...
unless, within ten days after notice that such [unfair labor practice] charge has
been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence
that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for voluntary adjustment of,
the dispute . . . (emphasis added).
29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1964). See note 4 supra.
The abstention provision was intended to encourage and stimulate private
settlements of jurisdictional disputes between the parties involved, thereby permanently resolving the dispute without the need for Board action. See ABA REPORT,
supra note 3, at 456-57 and text accompanying notes 54 & 55 infra.
18. See Local 173, Wood Lathers (Newark & Essex Plastering Co.), 121
N.L.R.B. 1094, 1109 & n.37 (1958) ; Broadcast Eng'rs, Local 1212 (C.B.S.), 119
N.L.R.B. 594, 597 (1958); Local 16, Longshoremen's (Denali-McCray Constr. Co.),
118 N.L.R.B. 109, 113 (1957) ; Local 675, Operating Eng'rs (Port Everglades
Terminal Co.), 116 N.L.R.B. 27, 38 n.10 (1956).
19. See, e.g., Los Angeles Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council (Westinghouse
Elec. Corp.), 83 N.L.R.B. 477, 482 (1949); Union of Marine Cooks (Irwin-Lyons
Lumber Co.), 82 N.L.R.B. 916, 922 n.ll (1949); Longshoremen's Union (Juneau
Spruce Corp.), 82 N.L.R.B. 650 (1949) ; Lodge 68, Machinists (Moore Drydock Co.),
81 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1949).
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10(k), the Board did not make an affirmative award of the work to
either of the disputing unions or employee groups, and in its section
10(k) "decision," merely recognized and protected the employer's assignment and right to assign 20° The Board's position was challenged several
times by unions, resulting in a split among the circuit courts. 21
In 1961, the United States Supreme Court attempted to settle the
matter in NLRB v. Radio Broadcast Engineers, Local 1212 (hereinafter "C.B.S."). 22 In C.B.S., the Court rejected the Board's position
and held that the "hear and determine" provision placed upon the Board
the sole responsibility for the compulsory determination of jurisdictional
disputes and required it to: (1) determine such disputes on their merits;
(2) decide which union or employee group was entitled to the work;
and (3) award the work accordingly. 23
Since 1947, the Board's interpretation of the abstention provision
of section 10(k) 24 has been that it is barred from holding a hearing

where it is shown that the "parties to such dispute" have adjusted it or
have voluntarily agreed upon methods for settlement. However, in construing the phrase "parties to such dispute", the Board has long held
that the employer who made the original work assignment, as well as
the rival unions or employee groups, is to be included as a "party". 25
20. The Board's interpretation of section 10(k) and its conduct thereunder was

based on the theory that section 8(b) (4) (D) merely guaranteed the employer's right
to make assignments without being subjected to strike pressures and granted to the
employer an unlimited right to assign work, unless one of the unions previously had
obtained a Board order or certification or was entitled to the work under a collective
bargaining contract. Local 173, Wood Lathers (Newark & Essex Plastering Co.),
121 N.L.R.B. 1094, 1108-09 (1958) ; ABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 452-53;
O'Donoghue, JurisdictionalDisputes in the Construction Industry Since C.B.S., 52
GEo. L.J. 314, 314-15 (1964); Sussman, Section 10(k): Mandate for Change?, 47
B.U.L. REv. 201, 203 (1967).
21. The Second, Third, and Seventh circuits rejected the Board's interpretation
and held that section 10(k) required a determination on the merits and an affirmative
award to one of the disputing unions. NLRB v. Broadcast Eng'rs, Local 1212, 272
F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1959), aff'd. 364 U.S. 573 (1961) ; NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 261 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1958); Plumbing & Pipefitting Journeymen, Locals
420 & 428, 242 F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1957).
The Board's position was upheld by the Fifth circuit in NLRB v. Local 450,
Operating Eng'rs, 275 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1960).
22. 364 U.S. 573 (1961), aff'g 272 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1959).
23. 364 U.S. at 579, 586. The Court reasoned that both the language of sections 8(b) (4) (D) and 10(k) and the legislative history of these sections supported
its holding and required a rejection of the Board's view. 364 U.S. at 579-82 (1961).
See, e.g., Shneidman, JurisdictionalDisputes and the National Labor Relations Board,
12 LAB. L.J. 1183 (1961).
24. See note 17 supra.
25. See, e.g., Local 300, Plumbing & Pipefitting Journeymen (D'Annunzio Bros.,
Inc.), 155 N.L.R.B. 836, 839-40 (1965); Plasterers Local 65 (Twin City Tile &
Marble Co.), 152 N.L.R.B. 1609 (1965); Electrical Workers Local 26 (McCloskey
& Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1498, 1501-03 (1964) ; Local 68, Wood Lathers (Acoustics &
Specialties, Inc.), 142 N.L.R.B. 1073, 1076 (1963); Local 825, Operating Eng'rs
(Schwerman Co. of Pa., Inc.), 139 N.L.R.B. 1426, 1429 (1962) ; Carpenters Local
1622 (O.R. Karst), 139 N.L.R.B. 591, 594 (1962) ; Operating Eng'rs, Local 66 (Frank
P. Badolato & Son), 135 N.L.R.B. 1392, 1395-96 (1962). See Plasterers Local 79 v.
NLRB, ... F.2d
- n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (dissenting opinion).
The basic reasoning given most recently by the Board to support its interpretation of the abstention provision is that this has been the Board's position for
over twenty years and that this interpretation became a part of the Act as a result
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Under this reading of the abstention provision, the Board has abstained
from holding a section 10(k) hearing only where there was an actual
agreement between the disputing unions with a renunciation of the work
26
and a relinquishing of any claim thereto by one union or where the
rival unions plus the employer who made the original assignment have
27
However, the Board
agreed on a method of voluntary adjustment.
has never dismissed a hearing where the unions alone agreed on a
method of adjustment, or submitted the dispute to the Joint Board
without the employer being a party to such an agreement or being bound
by the Joint Board's decision. 28 In fact, the Board, notwithstanding a
few exceptions, 29 has tended to completely disregard such inter-union
agreements and Joint Board determinations, while continuing to give
inordinate weight to employer assignments."0
of Con'zress' failure to disturb or question it in the 1959 amendments to the Act.
155 N.L.R.B. at 840. These are also the primary arguments of the Board in the instant case. See notes 65-68 infra and accompanying text.

26. The Board has abstained where there was an actual adjustment by the
unions in Local 1905, Carpet Layers (Southwestern Floor Co.), 143 N.L.R.B. 251
(1963); Millwrights & Mach. Erectors, Local 1102 (Port Huron Sulphite & Paper
Co.), 140 N.L.R.B. 79 (1962) ; Teamsters Local 107 (Safeway Stores, Inc.), 134
N.L.R.B. 1320 (1961).
This is the Board's so-called Safeway doctrine. The reasoning given by the
Board for quashing a section 10(k) hearing in such cases is that where there is an
actual adjustment between the unions with a renunciation of the work, there is no
longer a jurisdictional dispute to be heard and determined at a 10(k) hearing and
thus no reason for holding one. See O'Donoghue, supra note 20, at 334.
27. A section 10(k) hearing was quashed where the unions and the employer
agreed on an adjustment method in Millwrights Local 1102 (Don Cartage Co.), 121
N.L.R.B. 101 (1958); Plumbers Local 761 (Matt. J. Zaich Construction Co.), 144
N.L.R.B. 133 (1963); Local 708, Ironworkers (Armco Drainage & Metal Products
Co.), 137 N.L.R.B. 1753 (1962).
28. See note 25 supra.
29. These exceptions are Carpenters Local 690 (The Walter Corp.), 151 N.L.R.B.
741 (1965) ; Sheet Metal Workers, Local 162 (Lusterlite Corp.), 151 N.L.R.B. 195
(1965) ; Local 68, Wood Lathers (Acoustics & Specialties, Inc.), 142 N.L.R.B. 1073
(1963). It should be noted that it was not until the Acoustics & Specialties case in
1963 (two years after C.B.S.) that the Board departed from an employer's assignment
to give effect to a purely inter-union agreement, even though it was contrary to the
employer's wishes, remarking that "[a]n employer assignment . . . cannot be in all
cases the controlling factor .... " 142 N.L.R.B. at 1079 n.4.
30. See, e.g., Carpenters Local 1622 (O.R. Karst), 139 N.L.R.B. 591 (1962)
Operating Eng'rs, Local 66 (Frank P. Badolato & Son), 135 N.L.R.B. 1392 (1962).
With regard to the standards to be applied by the Board in deciding a
jurisdictional dispute under section 10(k), the Supreme Court had instructed that
"[e]xperience and common sense will supply the grounds for the performance of this
job which Congress has assigned the Board." 364 U.S. at 583. Since C.B.S., the
Board has used some twelve different factors or criteria in making a determination,
which, in order of frequency of use, are: employer's work assignment, collective bargaining contract, area and industry practice, work skills, efficiency of operation, traditional jurisdictional claims, Joint Board awards, interunion agreements, substitution
of function, acquiesence, arbitration awards, and certification and appropriate unit.
Note, JurisdictionalDisputes Since the C.B.S. Decision, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 657, 681-82
n.183 (1964). However, every study on section 10(k) which has been published since
the C.B.S. case:
concludes that apparently the Board has ignored or juggled the factors before it
in a given case, often inconsistently, to reach an apparently preconceived result....
[Wlhat are the results? Of 115 cases decided under section 10(k) since C.B.S,
108 have resulted in decisions which affirmed the work assignments that had been
made by the employer in the case.
ABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 455.
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The Board's refusal to defer to purely interunion agreements on
methods of adjustment has not been challenged to any great extent.
There have been union challenges to the Board's interpretation of the
abstention provision at section 10(k) hearings, 3 ' but prior to the instant
case its view has never been challenged in the federal courts.
The court's holding, in the instant case, - that the abstention provision in section 10(k) bars a hearing where the unions have agreed to
settle their dispute through binding arbitration, and that the employer
need not be considered a party to the dispute for the purposes of that
provision - overturns more than twenty years of Board decisions to
the contrary.3 2 In so holding, the majority reasoned that its interpretation of the abstention provision was supported "not only in the text of
10(k) but also in judicial precedents construing the provisions of the
Act dealing with jurisdictional disputes and in the legislative history
'33
and congressional purpose underlying these provisions.
The text of section 10(k) requires abstention when "the parties to
such dispute . . . have adjusted, or [have] agreed upon methods for the

voluntary adjustment of, the dispute." 84 The majority reasoned, as did the
Supreme Court in C.B.S., 85 that the text indicates that "such dispute"
can only mean the "dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall
have arisen" which is the jurisdictional dispute to which only the rival
unions, and not the employer, are parties. 36 A close examination of
sections 8(b) (4) (D) and 10(k) reveals the validity of this construction.
Since an unfair labor practice within the meaning of section 8(b) (4) (D)
is the jurisdictional strike and "such dispute" in section 10(k) refers
to the dispute out of which the unfair labor practice or strike arose,
the dispute under section 10(k) can only be the jurisdictional dispute.
A jurisdictional strike can arise only out of either a jurisdictional dispute between two unions or a dispute between the employer and one
union. In the latter situation, section 10(k) is not applicable at all.3 7
Judge MacKinnon in his dissenting opinion posited the counterargument that the text of section 10(k) indicates that the "dispute out
of which the unfair labor practice arose" is primarily the jurisdictional
strike and only remotely the jurisdictional dispute. From this he concluded that since the employer obviously is involved as a party to the
strike (the strike having been directed against the employer), the em31. See, e.g., Electrical Workers Local 26 (McCloskey & Co.), 147 N.L.R.B.
1498, 1501 (1964).
32. __ F.2d at ------33. Id. at - -...
34. 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1964). See note 4 supra.
35. 364 U.S. at 579. See text accompanying note 46 infra.
36. --- F.2d at .... That the rival unions are the only parties to the jurisdictional
dispute is clear from the general definition of such a dispute since it is a contest as
to which employees are entitled to do certain work. See 364 U.S. at 579 and note 2
supra.

37. See Penello v. Local 59, Sheet Metal Workers, 195 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del.
1961) and note 48 infra.
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ployer is a party to "such dispute" under the abstention provision therefore making the Board's reading of the provision correct.38 However,
this reading is unsupported by the text of sections 10(k) and 8(b)
(4) (D). Since section 8(b) (4) (D) gives the definition of a jurisdictional strike and proscribes it as being an unfair labor practice, 39 the
only conclusion that can be drawn is that "an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of paragraph (4) (D) of section 8(b)" is the jurisdictional strike. Thus, it is evident from the text of section 8(b) (4) (D)
that an unfair labor practice within the meaning of that section and the
jurisdictional strike are one and the same. This being the case, the
40
latter cannot be a dispute out of which the former arose.
The additional reason given by the majority for its position "[t]he fact that the employer is not bound by a 10(k) determination
of the Board is persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend a voluntary procedure for adjustment to be held inadequate because the employer is not bound"' 4 1 - is extremely cogent since there appears to be
no reason why the employer should be bound by the arbitration and not
by the section 10(k) hearings. 42 This reasoning is even more persuasive
43
when considered in conjunction with the last sentence of section 10(k).
In language almost identical to that in the abstention provision, i.e.,
"parties to the dispute", this sentence commands dismissal of the unfair
labor practice charges upon compliance by such parties. But, since only
the rival unions, and not the employer, are required to comply (the
employer not being bound by a section 10(k) determination), "parties to
the dispute" would refer only to the unions. No reason appears for
reading "parties to such dispute", in the abstention provision, and "parties
to the disputes", in the last sentence of section 10(k) differently. To
the contrary, the conclusion that both phrases should be construed similarly is most compelling.
Even though there are no judicial precedents on the precise question involved in the instant case, the majority correctly utilized C.B.S.
and the recent district court case of Penello v. Local 59, Sheet Metal
38 .
F.2d at ____(dissenting opinion).
39. See note 15 supra.
40. It is the unfair labor practice charge which arises out of the jurisdictional
strike. However, the dispute to be determined under section 10(k), or the one to be
adjusted by the parties, is the dispute out of which the unfair labor practice arose
and not the dispute out of which the unfair labor practice charge arose. See note 5
supra. In fact, the charge is dismissed upon compliance with the Board's determination or upon a voluntary adjustment, under the final sentence of section 10(k). See
note 6 supra.
41 .

..

F.2d at ......

42. The argument by the Board on this point is not persuasive. If employer
acceptance of the voluntary adjustment is so necessary for preserving industrial peace
and is a prerequisite for a final resolution of the dispute, Brief for the Board at 17,
Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB -.....
F.2d ____(D.C. Cir. 1970), then arguably Congress
would have required the employer to accept the section 10(k) determination by binding
him to it. The fact that Congress did not, would seem to indicate that it did not
believe that employer acceptance was so important or necessary.

43. See note 6 supra.
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Workers44 as precedents for the construction of section 10(k) since
both cases mentioned the abstention provision and commented on the
construction thereof while construing section 10(k) for other purposes. 45
In C.B.S., the Supreme Court stated that "the clause 'the dispute
out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen' can have no
other meaning except . . . a dispute between two or more groups of
employees, . . . .-4 The reading of the implications of such language

by the majority in the instant case seems valid, for if the dispute under
section 10(k) is a "dispute between two or more groups of employees",
then obviously such employee groups are "the parties to the dispute"
under the abstention provision. The language from the Penello case
cited by the majority, 47 directly supports its rejection of the Board's
interpretation.4 8 The district court's statement that:
[N]ot only does the Supreme Court view the policies of § 10(k)
as directed towards inducing voluntary settlement between the
groups of employees involved
but also the language of that section
49
would seem to compel it.

has the further effect of tying what was said in the C.B.S. case more
closely to the instant decision for, in so stating, the court was asserting
that C.B.S. supports a rejection of the Board's interpretation.50
Admittedly, as argued by the dissent, these two cases do not touch
the precise question involved here, but they do concern section 10(k)
construction and the opinions indicate that the courts involved would
44. 195 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1961).
45. In the C.B.S. case, the Supreme Court was interpreting section 10(k) in
order to determine what the Board was required to do in a 10(k) hearing. However,
in so doing, the Court implicitly supported an interpretation of the words "parties to
such dispute" which was contrary to that of the Board and in accord with the majority
in the instant case. 364 U.S. at 579. In the case of Penello v. Local 59, Sheet Metal
Workers, 195 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1961), the court was concerned with the question
of whether section 10(k) applied to a dispute between an employer and only one
union, without there being a dispute between rival unions. In discussing that question,
the court stated that it read the abstention provision differently than the Board and
that the Board's reading was unsupported. 195 F. Supp. at 466.

46. 364 U.S. at 579.
47. 195 F. Supp. at 466; see
F.2d at
48. In the Penello case, it was held that section 10(k) had no application where
the dispute was solely between the employer and the striking union. 195 F. Supp. at
471. However, as was noted by the Penello court, 195 F. Supp. at 466 n.52, where
the unions alone agree on a method of voluntary adjustment, the only dispute remaining, unless the settlement procedures break down, is between the employer and the
striking union. Thus, it would appear that Penello strongly supports the instant
holding, which would seem to follow directly from the Penello holding and opinion.
Also, the Board's own Safeway doctrine would appear to support the instant
holding under the same reasoning. There is no jurisdictional dispute to be determined
where there is an agreement on an adjustment method by the rival unions (the only
dispute then being between the employer and the striking union which is not a jurisdictional dispute), just as there is no dispute where there is an actual adjustment
between the unions. Therefore, the section 10(k) hearing should be quashed in the
former situation, as the Board has done in the latter. See note 26 supra and accompanying text; O'Donoghue, supra note 20, at 334.
49. 195 F. Supp. at 466.
50. See note 54 infra and accompanying text.
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probably have held the same as the majority in the instant case, had they
confronted the same issue. On the other hand, the cases relied on by
the dissent, including Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.51 do not
consider the construction of section 10(k) and merely reflect the Board's
view without discussing it. In each of the three cases cited by the dissent
in support of their position, 52 one of the issues was whether the Board
was barred from holding a hearing under this provision. However, the
question in these cases was not whether the employer, as well as the
unions, had to agree on a method of voluntary adjustment or be bound
thereby, but whether in fact the employer did agree or was bound in
the particular instance. It appears that the parties in these cases, as well
as the courts, merely assumed that the Board's position was correct
without challenging it.53
The legislative history discussed by the majority, along with the
remarks concerning legislative history and congressional purpose in the
C.B.S. case, give additional support to the majority's view. Section
10(k) can offer "strong inducements to quarrelling unions to settle
their differences" 54 and have a "beneficial effect in stimulating labor
to set up appropriate machinery for settlement of such controversies
within their own ranks"515 only if the abstention provision bars a hearing when the rival unions alone have settled their disputes or have agreed
on methods for doing so. 56 A provision which requires employers to be
involved in a settlement agreement before the Board is barred from
determining the dispute could not induce or stimulate purely inter-union
settlement agreements. Furthermore, there is nothing in the legislative
history to the effect that the employer should or must be involved.
The broad purpose of section 10(k) - the obtaining of permanent
resolutions to jurisdictional disputes to protect "neutral" employers 7 is served more effectively by a binding voluntary settlement agreement
between the unions alone than by a section 10(k) determination.r 8 In
the first place, a dispute can be resolved through voluntary arbitration proceedings in much less time than it can be resolved by the Board.5 9
51. 375 U.S. 261 (1964). The portion of this opinion quoted by Judge MacKinnon
does not imply anything that would indicate a rejection of the instant holding. The
Court in that case was not concerned with a jurisdictional dispute, but instead with a
representative dispute, see note 2 supra. Thus whatever was said about sections
10(k) and 8(b) (4) (D) was dicta. See Sussman, supra note 20, at 228.
52. New Orleans Typographical Union No. 17 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 755 (5th Cir.
1966) ; NLRB v. Local 825, Operating Eng'rs, 326 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1964); Local
450, Operating Eng'rs v. Elliott, 256 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1958). See - F.2d at - n.1l.
53. See O'Donoghue, supra note 20, at 332-33.
54. 364 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added),
55. 93 CONG. REc. 6665 (1947) (Remarks of Senator Murray) (emphasis added).
56. See ABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 456; Sussman, supra note 20, at 209-14,
226, 230.
57. A "neutral" employer is "one who cares not how the dispute is decided but
wants merely that it be decided." ___ F.2d at ------58. See ABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 459.
59. See ABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 459; O'Donoghue, supra note 19, at 330-31.
The Board's slowness in making a determination under section 10(k) is due, at
least in part, to the large number of disputes that the Board must hear and the result-
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This is extremely important in the construction industry where a substantial majority of jurisdictional disputes occur, because of work schedules
and project duration. A determination which is made long after the
dispute arose is quite often worthless since the work in question in most
cases has been completed. Moreover, as stated by the majority in the
instant case:
[Tihe availability of a binding agreement between the disputing
unions creates means of enforcing a permanent resolution of the dispute not otherwise available to the board.6 °
Whereas the Board is not empowered to compel an employer to alter
his original work assignment or a union to renounce such an assignment,
an arbitration award is enforceable by peaceful means including considerations of honor, reciprocity, and mutuality. Further, the union that received the arbitration award may bring an action in federal court under
section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act"' or in a state
court, to obtain injunctive relief to enforce such award against a union
that has failed to comply with it.62 Because of these factors, it is the
generally accepted policy that full scope should be given to voluntary
arbitration procedures and that the private settlement of disputes is
favored.6 3 Finally, the broad purposes of section 10(k) are not only
served more effectively by voluntary arbitration, but are greatly retarded
by a Board hearing subsequent to the issuance of an arbitration award,
for "to give the losing union another bite at the apple in the 10(k)
ing case backlog. Since most jurisdictional disputes arise in the construction industry,
where the Joint Board machinery has long been in existence, a large percentage of
the disputes which prior to the instant case, the Board has heard under section 10(k)
can, under the instant holding, be resolved quickly and efficiently by the Joint Board.
Thus, not only is the instant holding supported by the greater speed of voluntary
arbitration, but also by the consideration that such a holding will tend to increase the
speed and efficiency of Board determinations under section 10(k) by reducing the
number of disputes that will be presented to it.
60. - F.2d at _
61. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), provides in pertinent part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees ...or between any such labor organizations, may
be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties, ...
62. Where the jurisdictional dispute has been submitted to and determined by the
Joint Board, there are methods of enforcing the award provided by the Joint Board's
own procedural Rules and Regulations.

PROCEDURAL RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE
NATIONAL JOINT BOARD FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES, BUILDING
AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY (1962), cited in O'Donoghue, supra note 20, at 329-31;

F.2d at ___ n.24.

63. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) ; Carey
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); ABA REPORT, supra note 3,
at 457; Sussman, supra note 20, at 228.
The majority in the instant case reasoned that "[o]ur understanding of the
thrust of Federal labor policy as developed by Congress proceeds along lines congruous to those developed by the Supreme Court in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerk's," in which the Supreme Court reversed a prior decision in order to maintain
the effectiveness of voluntary arbitration proceedings. __ F.2d at _
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hearing is only to permit the jurisdictional battle to begin anew as a
6' 4
matter of right and principle.
It would appear that the only argument against the majority's
view is that it has the blessing of age in that the Board has followed
its interpretation for over twenty years. Admittedly, deference should
be given to the interpretation of the agency charged with the administration of a statutory provision, and where there is doubt as to the
proper construction, such interpretation must be given conclusive
weight.6 5 However, the Board's reading of the abstention provision
cannot be considered a "sound" interpretation after the Supreme Court's
rejection in C.B.S. of the Board's reading of the "hear and determine"
provision. In fact, the Court's decision in C.B.S. would appear to
have cast considerable doubt upon the validity of the Board's interpretation of any provision of section 10(k) and should have at least caused
the Board to closely examine its reading of the abstention provision.66
The Board's further argument that its interpretation became part of the
statute as a result of the failure of Congress to modify section 10(k) in the
1959 amendments to the Act cannot be given any real weight, especially in
light of the Supreme Court's refusal to accept this argument in the C.B.S.
case.67 As the Supreme Court reiterated in the recent case of Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union,68 conclusive weight cannot be given
to congressional silence alone, and this would seem particularly true with
respect to the abstention provision which seems all too clear on its face.
Although the majority primarily discussed "neutral" employers, it
made it clear that its holding applied even if the employers were nonneutral by stating that "the construction of §10(k) approved today
means . . .that proceedings may be dismissed although an employer
is dissatisfied with, and would prefer to contest and litigate, the agreement
reached by the unions."69 However, an argument might be made that the
scope of the holding in Plasterers should not extend to non-neutral employers because of their economic interest in the settlement of the dispute.
In light of the reasons given by the majority for extending the
instant decision to encompass non-neutral employers their conclusion
64.
65.
doubtful
Council,

- F.2d at _
"The Board's interpretation of the Act and the Board's application of it in
situations are entitled to weight." NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Constr. Trades
341 U.S. 675, 692 (1950).

66. The majority in the instant case went even further in asserting that the
C.B.S. decision "should have alerted the Board to modify its interpretation."
---F.2d at

67. 364 U.S. at 585.
68. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
69... F.2d at _. Since a neutral employer does not care how the dispute is
decided, a non-neutral employer must be one who does care and who desires that the
dispute be decided in favor of a particular union. Generally, such an employer would

want the work awarded to the union members to which he had originally assigned it,
and would be dissatisfied if it was not so awarded.
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seems to be most appropriate. First, the majority referred to the fact
that under its Safeway doctrine,70 the Board has abstained from holding
a section 10(k) hearing where the rival unions have actually adjusted
the dispute regardless of the feelings of the employer involved and "even
though the employer is not really neutral as between the unions."' The
basis of this doctrine is that a non-neutral employer's interests do not
require the Board to hear and determine the dispute where the unions
have actually reached a settlement. Under this same rationale the Board
should not be required to hear the dispute where the unions have agreed
on a method of adjustment. Further, the express legislative purpose of
section 10(k) is to protect neutral employers by resolving jurisdictional
disputes. 72 Where a dispute has been resolved by binding arbitration so
that a neutral employer is satisfied and protected, 73 a Board hearing to
determine the dispute would not be necessary in order to serve the
dominant purpose of the section even though the particular employer
involved was not satisfied. Admittedly, a non-neutral employer has a
greater interest in the adjustment of a dispute, but section 10(k), and
the Act in general, go beyond the satisfaction of particular employer
interests.7 4 The only relevant interest related to the purpose of section
10(k) is the interest in resolving jurisdictional disputes, irrespective of
the manner in which such disputes are resolved.
In the final analysis, the opposing arguments are reduced to an
interpretation of the text of section 10(k) in conjunction with section
8(b) (4) (D), placed against a long-standing Board policy which has been
challenged by a recent Supreme Court decision. 75 It would appear that
the language of section 10(k) alone is so clear as to place the majority
reading beyond dispute. Furthermore, it seems that the majority's view
is conclusive when considered in light of the general principles that full
scope should always be given to voluntary arbitration procedures and that
private settlement of disputes is favored.7 6 If the Supreme Court is
ever presented with the precise question involved in the instant case,
Plasterers will offer strong precedent for holding that the Board is
precluded from conducting a section 10(k) hearing where the unions
have agreed to settle their dispute through binding arbitration, regardless
of whether the employer was a party to such settlement agreement.
James A. Shellenberger
70. See note 25 supra.
71. __ F.2d at _
72. 364 U.S. at 580-81 ; see note 16 supra.

73. See notes 57-64 supraand the accompanying text.
74. See Sussman, supra note 20, at 209.
75. NLRB v. Broadcast Eng'rs, Local 1212, 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
76. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964) ; ABA
supra note 3, at 457; Sussman, supra note 20, at 228.
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Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (N.Y. 1969)
Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co. (N.Y. 1969)
In 1965 petitioner Cecile Mendel was walking through one of the
entrance doors leading from the public street into the premises of the
Central Trust Company when the door, which had been delivered and
installed seven years earlier by the respondent Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Company, struck her, causing personal injuries. Petitioner, seeking recovery for personal injuries and consequential damages, alleged four causes
of action, two sounding in negligence and two sounding in breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The Appellate Division
affirmed the decision of Special Term granting respondent's motion to
dismiss those causes of action based upon a breach of implied warranty.'
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals, in a 4-3 decision, affirmed
the judgment of the Appellate Division, holding that an action based upon
an alleged breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under the Sales Act of New York is a contract action in which (1)
the cause of action accrues at the time of sale and (2) the six-year statute
of limitations applicable to contract actions 2 applies. Since this period had
already run, the plaintiff's causes of action based upon a breach of implied
warranty were barred. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d
340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
Approximately one month later, the New York Court of Appeals was
again faced with a products liability case. The cause of action in this case
was based on an alleged breach of implied warranty of merchantability.
The injured and deceased parties were members of a sewer repair crew
supervised by an engineer. The engineer, who was wearing an oxygenproducing mask manufactured by the defendant, became endangered while
working in the sewer when a defect caused the mask to function improperly.
One plaintiff co-worker, also working in the sewer, removed his mask to
call for help. In response to his call, the remaining plaintiff co-workers
entered the sewer without masks in a rescue attempt. Three of the men
1. 57 Misc. 2d 45, 291 N.Y.S.2d 94, aff'd, 29 App. Div. 2d 918, 290 N.Y.S.2d
186 (1967).
2. The statute of limitations under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, which

specifies a four year period running from the date of the breach of warranty, was not
applicable because the cause of action accrued before the Act became effective in New
York. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1964). This action is governed by the six
year limitation as specified in N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 213 (McKinney 1963).
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died and the others sustained injuries because of the presence of poisonous
gas in the sewer.
The surviving plaintiffs and the administrators of the decedents'
estates brought actions in the Supreme Court of New York to recover
damages for wrongful death, conscious pain and suffering, and personal
injuries. The actions were brought upon the theory that the breach of an
implied warranty may serve as a basis for the invocation of the doctrine
of "danger invites rescue."
The question of breach of implied warranty of merchantability arising from the sale of the oxygen-producing masks had been litigated in an
action brought by the engineer's estate against the seller.3 The finding of
the trial court in that action - that there had been such a breach - was
considered by the supreme court to be settled and binding on the defendant-manufacturer in the instant case. The trial court awarded a
verdict to the plaintiffs on the theory that the danger created by the breach
of implied warranty invited rescue. On appeal, the New York Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that one who by his culpable act, whether it
stems from negligence or breach of warranty, places another in a position
of imminent peril, may be held liable for any damages sustained by a rescuer
in his attempt to aid the imperiled victim. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Company, 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969).
An action for breach of warranty, originally sounding in tort,4 evolved
during a period in which contract theories were applicable 5 and ultimately
emerged as a "freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and
contract."'6 As a result, there were no distinct rules applicable in each and
every action, which might have been the case had breach of warranty been
controlled exclusively by either tort or contract principles. 7 Contract rules,
however, did appear to predominate because of the general feeling that
warranty was basically a sales problem." However, recent consideration
for the consumer, who has often been denied recovery for injuries caused
by defective products because of a failure to meet some technical contract
requirement, has led to the abrogation of several of the formal warranty
requirements; the most notable one being privity. 9 The elimination of
privity as a pre-requisite to recovery for breach of warranty has been
3. Rooney v. Healy Co., 20 N.Y.2d 42, 228 N.E.2d 383, 281 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1967).
4. "The action on a warranty was regarded as an action of deceit .. " 1 S.
WILLISTON, SALES § 195 (rev. ed. 1948). See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manu-

facturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
5. S. WILLISTON, supra note 4, at 195. Wade, supra note 4,at 6.
6. Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960).
7. Id. at 1126. See also 3 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY

§ 40.01[1] (1968), referring to the applicable statute of limitations.
8. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REv. 791, 801 (1966).
9. Other examples of such requirements which had an effect on warranty actions
in the past were reliance by the plaintiff upon an assertion of the seller and notice of
the breach of warranty given within a reasonable time after the buyer had reason to
know of the breach. See Prosser, supra note 8,at 801.
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well documented' o and will be examined only with respect to its status
in New York.
The erosion of the requirement of horizontal privity" began for all
practical purposes with the New York Court of Appeals decision in
Greenberg v. Lorenz.a2 In that case a retailer of goods was held liable
to all members of the household of the purchaser for the breach of warranty of wholesomeness of food. The concurring opinion expressly noted
that this was a contract action in which the elimination of the privity
requirement was limited to the circumstances of the case.'8 The same
court considered the question of vertical privity in Randy Knitwear v.
American Cyanamid Co.,1 4 holding that a manufacturer was liable to a
remote purchaser for the breach of an express warranty regardless of the
absence of privity. In this case the court considered the nature and extent
of the manufacturer's advertising and concluded that its representations
were intended to affect ultimate consumers and were therefore not made
only to the immediate vendee in the distributive chain.', The court, treating the action as one grounded in contract,' 6 effectively abolished the
requirement of vertical privity in breach of express warranty cases.
In Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,17 the New York Court

of Appeals was presented with the alternative of either continuing to decide
breach of warranty cases on the basis of contract law or eliminating contract theories and adopting a theory of strict liability in tort.18 In its
10. See, e.g., 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.03, § 16.04
(1968) [hereinafter cited as FRUMER & FRIEDMAN]; Gillam, Products Liability in
a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REV. 119, 131-49 (1958). See also Hart, Commercial Law,
Sales: Vendors' Liability, Warranty, and Privity, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1476 (1961);
Koerner, The Beleagured Citadel of Privity in the Distributive Process of the Sale
of Goods, 7 N.Y.L.F. 176 (1961) ; Prosser, supra note 6; Prosser, supra note 8.
11. Horizontal privity involves the question of how far the benefits of a warranty
extend to nonpurchasers of the product, i.e., who may bring suit upon a breach of the
warranty. See Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts
Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L.
REV. 692, 697 (1965); Comment, Recent Developments in Products Liability Law in
Pennsylvania, 14 VILL. L. REV. 747 & n.4 (1969).
12. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
13. The court noted that elimination of the horizontal privity requirement should
be made on a step by step basis and felt that the decision here was not a sweeping
inroad into that requirement since this was a food case where a high standard of
responsibility should be imposed. 9 N.Y.2d at 201, 173 N.E.2d at 776, 213 N.Y.S.2d
at 43.
The rule of Greenberg has been expressly extended to permit an employee of
a purchaser to recover against the manufacturer of a defective product. Thomas v.
Leary, 15 App. Div. 2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1962).
14. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962). Vertical privity
involves the question of who in the distributive chain is subject to suit by the consumer. See Rapson, supra note 11, at 697; Comment, supra note 11.
15. 11 N.Y.2d at 12-13, 181 N.E.2d at 402-03, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
16. The court talked in terms of inducing reliance upon representations and of
estoppel, both of which are contract terms. 11 N.Y.2d at 13, 181 N.E.2d at 402-03, 226
N.Y.S.2d at 368. Also the court noted that a disclaimer by the seller would be
effective thus indicating a desire to retain contract theories. 11 N.Y.2d at 14, 181
N.E.2d at 403, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
17. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E. 2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
18. This theory was most clearly enunciated in the California case of Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
It was adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), and approved
by a number of jurisdictions. See note 54 infra.
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opinion, the court expressed approval of the strict liability in tort doctrine
as applied by the California Supreme Court in Greennan v. Yuba Power
Products,Inc.,19 but did not specifically commit New York to either theory
in its decision that an airplane assembler was liable to a passenger's estate
for breach of an implied warranty. 20 This decision, however, did confirm
the elimination of vertical privity as a prerequisite to recovery in an
action for breach of warranty and extended horizontal recovery to anyone
who could be reasonably contemplated to use the product.
The question of whether tort or contract theories control in an action
for breach of warranty once again presented itself to New York's highest
court in the Mendel case. The precise issue facing this court was whether
the statute of limitations applicable to contract actions or that which is
applicable to tort actions should be applied in an action for breach of
implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. There were two alternatives open to the court in this situation. Warranty aspects of products
liability law could either be controlled by the Sales Act and ultimately
by the Uniform Commercial Code or by section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts - one formulation of the strict tort liability doctrine.
Although an action brought under the tenets of the Sales Act and the
Uniform Commercial Code would be similar in many respects to one
21
brought in strict liability in tort, there are several areas of difference.
They include: (1) the applicable statute of limitations; (2) the requirement of notice to the seller; and (3) the effectiveness of disclaimers.
The Sales Act statute of limitations period applicable in a warranty
case is six years from tender of delivery, while under the Code the statute
of limitations period for a breach of warranty action is four years from
tender of delivery. 22 In an action brought under the strict liability in tort
doctrine the statute of limitations period is that period generally applicable
to tort actions,23 which in New York is three years from the time of
injury. 24 Furthermore the Code requires notice of the breach within a
reasonable time to the seller 25 which is not required in an action brought
19. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).

20. The New York court considered "strict tort liability" to be "surely a more
accurate phrase" in describing the basis upon which liability for breach of warranty
is to be imposed. 12 N.Y.2d at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
21. Although the case was decided under the tenets of the SALES ACT, the result
would be the same under the Code. The decision would therefore determine whether,
in the future, warranty aspects of products liability would be controlled by the Code
or by section 402A. The focus here will be upon the similarities and differences
between the Code and section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.
22. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 213 (McKinney 1963); N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney
1964). See Rapson, supra note 11, at 704-07.
23. See Citizens Utilities v. American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409, 184 N.E.2d
171, 230 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1962) ; Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140,
111 N.E.2d 421 (1953). See Rapson, supra note 11, at 706-07.
24. N.Y CIv. PRAC. § 214 (McKinney 1963).
25. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-607 (McKinney 1964), provides:
(3) Where tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should
have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred
from any remedy. ...
See Rapson, supra note 11, at 707-09.
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in strict liability in tort.2 6 Additionally, disclaimers may be effective under
2s
the Code 27 but have no effect under the strict liability in tort doctrine.
With regard to the question of privity, it is clear that lack of privity
is no defense in an action brought in strict liability in tort. 29 There is
express language in section 402A that there need be no contractual relation with the seller.3 0 Comment I to that section explicitly eliminates
any requirement of vertical privity. The comment states:
[I]t is not necessary that the ultimate user or consumer have acquired
the products directly from the seller. .

.

. He may have acquired it

3
through one or more intermediate sellers. '

In taking a position on horizontal privity the comment further states that
the consumer need not be a purchaser and may be a member of the family
32
of the purchaser, or a guest or employee.
The situation with regard to privity in an action governed by the
Code, as enacted in New York, seems to be the same as one brought under
the strict liability in tort doctrine. The Code takes no position on vertical
privity and leaves the determination of whether it is to be required up to
the developing case law. 33 The New York case law as developed in Randy
Knitwear and Goldberg makes it clear that the requirement of vertical
privity has been eliminated in both express and implied warranty cases.
With respect to horizontal privity, section 2-318 of the Code as
adopted by New York extends the benefits of the buyer's warranty to the
buyer's family, household, and guests if it is reasonable to expect that such
34
natural person may use, consume, or be affected by the goods.
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m (1964). See Rapson,
supra note 11, at 707-09.
27. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-316 (McKinney 1964). See Rapson, supra note 11, at 709-11.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment it (1964). See Rapson,
supra note 11, at 709-11.
29. See Rapson, supra note 11, at 697.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964), provides:
(2) the Rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
"(1)"the user or consumer has not . . . entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment 1 (1964).
32. Id. The Restatement, in a caveat, explains that the American Law Institute
expresses no opinion as to whether the rules of section 402A apply to harm to persons
other than users or consumers.
33. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1964), comment 3.
34. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1964), provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if

it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by the breach of warranty.
This section (alternative a) is one of three alternatives proposed by the
Permanent Editorial Board for the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE for adoption by the
states. Alternative b extends the warranty benefits to "any natural person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods .. " Alternative c
extends the warranty benefits to "any person who may reasonably be expected to use,

consume or be affected by the goods ..
" There is no household, family or guest
limitation in either alternative b or c and corporations are allowed to take advantage
of warranties under alternative c.
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The petitioner in Mendel proceeded on the theory that her case created
a cause of action in which recovery could be sought for a tortious wrong
which accrued at the time of the injury and that since her action had
been brought within three years of that time3 5 it was not foreclosed by
the running of the statute of limitations period. This argument was based
on petitioner's reading of the Goldberg case to hold that a breach of warranty created a cause of action sounding in tort. However, the Court of
Appeals felt that Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp.38 was applicable
in deciding that the six-year statute of limitations3 7 governing contracts
should apply. In the opinion of the court, an action for breach of warranty was based upon "an implied contract obligation or liability."38
Furthermore, they rejected the petitioner's interpretation of the meaning
of Goldberg - that a breach of warranty was a tort action. The language
in Goldberg, which the petitioner argued supported her proposition,
stated that:
A breach of warranty, it is now clear, is not only a violation of the
sales contract out of which the warranty arises but is a tortious wrong
suable by a non-contracting party whose use of the warranted article is
within the reasonable contemplation of the vendor or manufacturer.3 9
The majority in Mendel, however, stated that Goldberg stood for the
proposition that the "cause of action which exists in favor of third party
' 40
strangers to the contract is an action for breach of implied warranty
to be based in contract. The significance of the court's interpretation of
Goldberg to the doctrine of implied warranty seems to be the abrogation
of the requirement of vertical privity and not the adoption of the doctrine
of strict liability in tort.
The petitioners in Mendel further argued that a three-year-from-thetime-of-injury statute of limitations period should apply only to those who
are strangers to the contract and thus recovery could be allowed without
disturbing the ruling in Blessington. However, the majority felt that this
rule would potentially afford greater rights to strangers to the contract
than to purchasers. The court also ruled out the establishment of such a
statute of limitations for all personal injury actions since any decision by
35. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. § 214 (McKinney 1963), provides that all actions for personal injury be brought within three years of the time of injury.
36. 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953). In this case the administrator of his

deceased infant son sued the manufacturer and retailer of certain clothing to recover
for pain and suffering caused the son when the clothing he was wearing ignited when
it came in contact with a flame. The action was based on breach of warranty of fitness
of clothing.
Any suit based in negligence had been barred by the running of the three year
tort statute of limitations period. The court held that a cause of action based on
implied warranty of fitness of clothing was subject to the six year contract statute
of limitations period.
37. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. § 213 (McKinney 1963), provides:
The following actions must be commenced within six years:
(2)" an action upon a contractual obligation or liability express or implied.
38. 25 N.Y.2d at 343, 253 N.E.2d at 208, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
39. 12 N.Y.2d at 436, 191 N.E.2d at 82, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 594.

40. 25 N.Y.2d at 344, 253 N.E.2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
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the courts in this matter had been pre-empted by the New York Legislature's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code which applied a four-yearfrom-the-time-of-sale-statute 4' in such actions. The logical extension of this
reasoning is that henceforth New York actions for breach of warranty will
be governed by the tenets of the Code and that the doctrine of strict liability in tort will not be the governing principle unless specifically adopted.
The majority also noted that strict liability in tort and implied warranty in the absence of privity are different ways of describing the same
cause of action. 42 This, however, does not seem to be an entirely accurate
statement since full explication of the elements of an action in breach of
4
warranty as opposed to one in strict liability in tort indicate differences. 1
In an action for breach of warranty under the Code, even though there
is no privity requirement 44 there is the possibility that the seller may effectively disclaim or modify warranties, 45 which is not the case in an action
based on strict liability in tort.46 Furthermore, under the Code there is
the requirement that the seller be notified of the breach within a reasonable
time 47 which does not apply to tort actions.
Perhaps the main reason for fashioning the rule in the Mendel case
was the court's concern over the possibility of a manufacturer being sued
for breach of warranty many years after the sale. Considering the problems of proof and the difficulties of establishing defenses many years after
the sale, the majority felt that by limiting such actions to within six years
of the time of sale, manufacturers would not be subject to a potential flood
41. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1964), provides:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within
four years after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the
aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty
occurs when tender of delivery is made....
See 25 N.Y.2d at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 209-10, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
42. See Lasher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: the Road to
and Past Vanderinark, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 30, 46 (1965).
43. See generally Percy, Products Liability - Tort or Contract or What, 40
TUL. L. REV. 715 (1966) ; Witherspoon, Torts or Warranties., 39 Miss. L.J. 199
1968). See pp. 205-06 supra.
44. See p. 206 supra and the accompanying footnotes.
45. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-316 (McKinney 1964), provides:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed
wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; .
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties
are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults" or other
language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention
to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty.
See Percy, supra note 43, at 727; Prosser, supra note 6, at 1131; Witherspoon, supra
note 43, at 213.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m (1964).
47. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-607 (McKinney 1964), provides in pertinent part:
(3) Where a tender has been accepted:
(a) the buyer must within reasonable time after he discovers or should
have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred
from any remedy . . .
See Witherspoon, supra note 43, at 214.
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of possibly unfounded claims. In reaching what it considered a desired
result, the court established a conclusive presumption that any injury
resulting from a defective product occurring after six years from the time
of sale is due to maintenance and operation. It stated:
[S] urely an injury resulting from a defective product many years after
it has been manufactured, presumptively at least, is due to operation
and maintenance. It is our opinion that to guard against unfounded
actions that would be brought many years after a product is manufactured, we must make that presumption conclusive by holding the
contract Statute of Limitations applicable to the instant action. .... 48
In dissenting, three members of the court took the position that a
breach of warranty in a products liability case should be determined on
the basis of tort theories and therefore the applicable statute of limitations
is that of a tort action which runs from the date of the injury. Using
language very similar to that used in section 402A of the Restatement of
Torts, 49 the dissenting judges were of the opinion that strict liability in tort
should apply. This was in agreement with the view expressed by many
commentators that the logical extension of Goldberg would be to apply
the theory of strict liability in tort.50
Judge Breitel, referring to the cases cited as precedent for the
majority's decision, reasoned that Goldberg did not clearly rule out strict
liability in tort but left both contract and tort theories available in suits
of this type.51 Furthermore, it was pointed out that in Blessington, the
plaintiff was allowed the benefit of the contract statute of limitations after
52
the tort statute of limitations had run its course.
In further reply to the majority's argument that a manufacturer
should not be subject to suit many years after the sale of its products, the
dissent emphasized that this exact situation is possible if the suit were
48. 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), imposes liability on "[o]ne
who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous" (emphasis
added). In 25 NY.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495, the dissent
uses "strict liability for unreasonably dangerous condition in a defective product.
(emphasis added).
50. See Prosser, supra note 8, at 804 & n.80, where it is stated that "other courts
at once agreed that the proper theory was not one of warranty at all, but simply of
strict liability in tort divorced from any contract rules." Footnote 80 cites Goldberg
as probable authority for this proposition in New York. Rapson, supra note 11 at 693
& n.5, states that "New York . . . courts have adopted the strict liability in tort
doctrine" citing Goldberg as authority for this proposition. A federal court, applying
New York law, interpreted the Goldberg decision as having adopted the strict liability
in tort doctrine. Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (1964).
51. For support of this reading of the Goldberg decision, see Percy, supra note 43,
at 723: "In short, the highest court of the state of New York does not appear to have
resolved the query [of whether products liability is a tort or contract action]."
52. The dissent stated that: "The existence of a cause of action in contracts did
not diminish or preclude any other remedy an injured party may have against the
manufacturer resulting from acts constituting the breach of contractual warranty
obligations." 25 N.Y.2d at 348, 253 N.E.2d at 212, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 497. This implies
that the contract statute of limitations was applied not to rule out tort actions but to
allow an avenue of recovery to an injured plaintiff when other possible grounds for
the action had been eliminated.
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based in negligence. Whether the suit is grounded in negligence or brought
under the strict liability in tort doctrine, the plaintiff will still be saddled
with the burden of proof which, as the dissent notes, will be a heavy one.53
The practical effect of the Mendel decision seems to be that it rules
out the doctrine of strict liability in tort which New York seemed to be
adopting in the Goldberg decision. If this conclusion is justified then
New York will be taking a position that is contrary to a growing number
of jurisdictions5 4 which have adopted this theory as a precise expression
of the law. Furthermore, since the plaintiffs here are precluded from
bringing an action in strict tort liability the probabilities are higher that
there will be an unjust result. This is a consideration which the majority
seemed to feel was secondary to the possibility of unfounded claims against
the manufacturers. Although a cause of action in negligence still exists
the plaintiff will have to meet a much heavier burden of proof 55 since it
is often very difficult to prove a specific negligent act on the part of a
manufacturer in the production of a defective product. Furthermore, it
seems that a manufacturer would have little difficulty in showing, as a
good defense to alleged negligence, that he exercised due care.
The problem of determining the parameters of liability in breach of
warranty cases also existed in Guarino. The Court of Appeals in Guarino
was not as emphatic in aligning itself with tort or contract theories as it
was in Mendel, perhaps because of an assumption that Mendel had decisively settled the issue. The immediate question before the court was
whether liability for breach of warranty could be extended to one who was
not a user of the product and who was not directly injured by it. Liability
was extended by application of the "danger invites rescue" doctrine56
which the court thought should apply regardless of what theory the action
was based upon. The rationale is that the manufacturer committed a
culpable act by supplying defective material which created a dangerous situ53. Plaintiff would have to prove:
(1) that the product was defective;
(2) that it was defective at the time it was sold (this includes some showing
of a connection between the product and the defendant) ;
(3) a causal connection between the defective product and the injury.
See Prosser, supra note 8, at 840-41.
54. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) ; Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 11. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965) ; Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965);
Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92 (1965) ; Wights
v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965). See generally 2 L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at § 16A[3].
55. See Note, Products Liability: A Synopsis, 30 OHiO ST. L.J. 551, 560 (1969)
Prosser, supra note 8, at 840. See generally Keeton, Products Liability - Proof of
the Manufacturer's Negligence, 49 VA. L. REv. 675 (1963) ; Keeton, Products Liability - Problems Pertainingto Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26 (1965).
56. The "danger invites rescue" doctrine had been used as the basis for recovery
in a number of cases. See, e.g., Dixon v. New York, N.H. & Hart. R.R., 207 Mass.
126, 92 N.E. 1030 (1910) ; Perpich v. Leetonia Mining Co., 118 Minn. 508, 137 N.W.
12 (1912) ; Gibney v. New York, 137 N.Y. 1, 33 N.E. 143 (1893) ; Eckert v. Long
Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871). Perhaps the most enlightening exposition of the
doctrine and the case most cited as authority for the proposition is Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
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ation in which it was foreseeable that rescue would be attempted. Under
this doctrine, the one who creates the danger is liable to the potential
rescuer. The court expressly noted that all the cases in which the rescue
doctrine was applied were negligence actions but stated that this fact alone
should not preclude the application of the doctrine here.57 In his concurring opinion, Judge Scileppi, who also wrote the majority opinion in
Mendel, indicated that he would limit the application of the rescue doctrine
in a breach of warranty action to factual situations similar to those in
Guarino and which evidence a "great moral obligation."5 8 He also expressed a concern similar to the one raised in Mendel - that such a
limitation was necessary to prevent a flood of litigation in such matters
and an undue imposition of liability upon manufacturers.
In extending liability for breach of warranty to a bystander, the
Guarino court has expanded two important aspects of products liability.
The rescue doctrine has been applied in an action based in contract59
and secondly, liability for breach of warranty has been extended to cover
one not using the product and also not directly injured by it. Application
of this doctrine in a contract action is in direct conflict with several cases
which have held that the commitment of a tortious wrong is a prerequisite
to recovery under this doctrine. 60 The court's response to this argument
was that a breach of warranty is a wrongful act and should therefore
impose liability just as a negligent act would. In applying the rescue
doctrine to the manufacturer of a defective product, the court adopted a
test of foreseeability. The test is whether it is equally foreseeable that
rescue will be attempted in a dangerous situation created by a contractual
breach of warranty as it is that rescue will be attempted in a negligently
created danger. Such a test has been espoused by several commentators 6'
62
and adopted in several cases.
Foreseeability can also serve as a strong argument for extending
liability for breach of warranty to non-users of a product who are not
directly injured by it. Although a non-using bystander has been per57. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 168, 306

N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969).
58. Id. at 466, 255 N.E.2d at 176, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 946.

59. Mendel established that breach of warranty was a contract action.
60. Rose v. Peters, 82 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1955) ; Neal v. Home Builders, Inc., 232

Ind. 160, 111 N.E.2d 280 (1953); Weller v. Chicago & N.W. R.R., 244 Iowa 149, 55
N.W.2d 720 (1952) ; Edgarton v. Welch, 321 Mass. 603, 74 N.E.2d 674 (1947).
61. In 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11.04[1] (1968),
it is stated: "Whether the intervening act of another agency is considered to be a new
and independent cause ... generally depends upon foreseeability of the intervening act."
In 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 28.16 at 1572 n.6 (1956) :
Such bystander injury is often a perfectly foreseeable risk of the maker's
enterprise and the considerations for imposing such risks on the maker without
regard to his fault do not stop with those who undertake to use the chattel. Such
a restriction is only the distorted shadow of a vanishing privity [requirement] ...
62. E.g., Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963). See Note, Implied Warranty - Foreseeability as a
Limitation to Liability, 9 WAYNE L. REv. 383 (1963).
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mitted recovery for injury in breach of warranty cases, 63 the product in
these cases has been classified as a "dangerous instrumentality" 64 and the
bystander had been injured directly by the defective product.65 There
seems to be, however, no reason for limiting liability only to these situations since the manufacturer's breach of warranty is equally responsible
for the injury in both cases. The argument that such imposition of
liability tends to stifle the pursuit of manufacturing is really not tenable in
view of the facts that the consumer or injured party has no other protection6" and the manufacturer is the only one in a position to "control the
'67
danger or make an equitable distribution of the losses when they occur.
A discussion of Mendel has been necessary for a complete analysis
of Guarino, since Guarino, taken alone, easily lends itself to a reading that
the New York court is equating a breach of warranty with a tortious
wrong. The court in Guarino used the language of Goldberg that "[a]
breach of warranty . . . is not only a violation of the sales contract . . .

but it is [also) a tortious wrong"' 8 and "[I]t is enough that the plaintiffs
attempted to rescue a user with respect to whom a breach of warranty or
'tortious wrong' had been committed."69 It does not seem unreasonable
to interpret this language as the adoption of a tort basis for an action
for breach of warranty.
63. Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965)
Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co., 208 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1968) ; Piercefield v. Remington
Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
64. See Note, Piercing the Shield of Privity in Products Liability - A Case for
the Bystander, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 266, 271-72 & n.58 (1968).
65. In Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965), a
widow was allowed to recover against the manufacturer of a car with defective brakes
which rolled down a golf course hill and killed her husband. In Toombs v. Fort Pierce
Gas Co., 208 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1968), plaintiffs were injured when a nearby defective
gas tank exploded. In Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d
129 (1965), a bystander was injured directly by the explosion of a gun because of a
defective shell. In Stroud v. Brands Punch Syrup Co., 205 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947), several bottles of ginger ale exploded in a grocery store. An employee,
who was trying to prevent the possibility of injury to customers, attempted to remove
the remaining bottles from that case from the shelves. In the process one bottle
exploded with resulting injury to her eye. In holding that to thus encounter the
danger was not negligence as a matter of law, the court alluded to the rescue doctrine.
This seems to be the only products liability case in which the rescue doctrine has had
any effect. However, once again the plaintiff had been injured directly by the defective product.
66. See Comment, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUm. L.
REV. 916, 928 (1964):
Indeed the chief draftsman of the Code apparently advocated extension of
strict liability even to the bystander: he spoke of liability without fault imposed
either through res ipsa loquitur or warranty as "a needed protection of the consumer (or of his son, servant, guest or victim)" (emphasis added),
citing Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society: I, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 699,
704 n.14 (1936).
67. In 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 28.1, at 1535 (1956), it is stated: "This
trend [of saddling the supplier of a commodity with liability] was responsive to evergrowing pressure for protection of the consumer, coupled with a realization that
liability would not unduly inhibit the enterprise of manufacturers and that they were
well placed both to profit from its lessons and to distribute its burdens."
68. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 168, 306
N.Y.S. 942 (1969) (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 465, 255 N.E.2d at 175, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 945 (citation omitted).
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However, the reading that Guarino is applying the rescue doctrine
in a contract action, and therefore that breach of warranty sounds in contract is just as reasonable and is consistent with the rationale of Mendel.
There is no reason to limit the application of the rescue doctrine to tortiously created dangers. The advantage of adopting the Code as the applicable law in a products liability case is that it extends to the courts the
tenets of the Code as guidelines in resolving questions of this type.
The disadvantage of this result is that the theory of strict liability
in tort has been rejected as a basis for a breach of warranty action. This
doctrine has been adopted by substantial and respectable authority 0 and
by the American Law Institute 7 because it eliminates the confusion of
tort and contract elements and is not unduly oppressive upon the business
of manufacturing since the plaintiff still has the burden of proving the
breach of warranty. Practically speaking, it may be argued that even in
adopting the Code as controlling, a plaintiff still has the same benefits
that he would have under the tort theory of strict liability because of the
elimination of many contract requirements created by case law. The major
obstacles confronting a plaintiff bringing an action under the Code include:
(1) the notice requirement ;72 (2) the application of the four-year-fromthe-time-of-sale statute of limitations ;73 (3) the possibility of effective
disclaimer.7 4 This does not seem to be overly burdensome, but the fact
is that injustice may result with the elimination of valid causes of action
because of the working of one of these exceptions. As stated by the
dissent in Mendel in which the running of the statute of limitations barred
a personal injury action based on a breach of warranty, "it is all but unthinkable that a person should be time barred from prosecuting a cause
' 75
of action before he ever had one."

Thomas J. Ziomek
70. See notes 18 and 54 supra.
71.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 402A (1965).

72. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-607 (McKinney 1964).
73. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1964).
74. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-316 (McKinney 1964).
75. 25 N.Y.2d at 347, 253 N.E.2d at 210-11, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
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